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Cultural Criticism of Law
Guyora Binder* and Robert Weisberg**
ProfessorsBinder and Weisberg expound a "cultural criticism" of law that
views law as an arenafor composing, representing, and contesting identity,
and that treats identity as constitutive of the interests that motivate instrumental action. They explicate this criticalmethod by reference to "New Histori-

cist" literary criticism, postmodern social theory, and Nietzchean aesthetics.
They illustrate this method by reviewing recentscholarship oftwo kinds: First,
they explore how legal disputes take on expressive meaning for parties and
observers against the background of legal norms regulating or recognizing
identities. Second, they examine "readings" of the representationsof character, credit, and value in commercial andfinancial law that emphasize the role
of the figurative imagination in the creation of markets and market society.
ProfessorsBinderand Weisberg conclude that law does not so much represent
a social world of subjects that exists independent of it, as it does compose that
world. Accordingly, the criticism enabledby their "cultural"account of law is
more aesthetic than epistemologicaL
I.

INTRODUCrION

William Fisher's fine contribution to this Symposium on "The Critical Use
of History" assesses the critical potential for legal scholarship of current trends
in historiography. 1 A striking theme in his report on the state of this art is the
prominent influence of literary theory in contemporary historical scholarship.
Fisher describes much recent intellectual history as either "Textualist"-reflecting the semiotic focus of literary structuralism and poststructuralism-or
"New Historicist"-reflecting the interest of that literary movement in the mutual influence of aesthetic and practical motivations, the cultural contingency of
social order, and the dramaturgical quality of social conflict. Perhaps it is not
surprising that literary method should figure prominently in an essay on historiography's "critical" potential. Doubtless one source of the popularity of the
adjective "critical" in contemporary scholarship is its sly equivocation between
political dissent and literary interpretation.
Readers of the Stanford Law Review will recognize that a similar literary
influence has long been apparent in legal scholarship, particularly legal scholarship that purports to be in some sense "critical." Textualist approaches and
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. The authors are grateful to workshop participants at Berkeley, Buffalo, and Stanford.
** Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Research for this article was
supported by the estate of Ira S. Lillick and other friends of the Stanford Law School.
I. See William W. Fisher IlI, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of
the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1997).
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concerns have dominated critical scholarship in law, but as this essay reveals,
something like a New Historicist criticism of the law is beginning to emerge as
well.
For some years, we have assessed the potential of literary method in understanding and critiquing legal texts, decisions, and institutions. 2 We have become persuaded that the use of Textualist methods to assess the determinacy or
objectivity of legal decisionmaking has less critical potential than meets the
eye. This is a view we have defended and will defend elsewhere. What we
will argue here is that the application of literary methods in "reading" legal
events, both historically remote and recent, holds considerable promise to illuminate the place of law in culture. In so doing it may also enrich our sense of
the value questions at stake in law. The works we will discuss are not primarily
by professional historians, but they all treat legal phenomena as artifacts to be
understood in light of an historically specific cultural context. They are less
works of critical history than they are works of New Historicist criticism.
Instead of seeing the "cultural criticism of law" as simply an application of
New Historicism to law, we can see both developments as aspects of the emergence of a broader interdisciplinary field of "Cultural Studies" which blurs the
boundaries between the humanities and the social sciences, viewing the phenomena studied by social scientists (including historians) as social texts available for interpretation and criticism. 3 Another aspect of this new field of

inquiry is an extension of the domain of ethnographic method from the study of
traditional non-Westem societies to modem Western societies, thereby both expanding anthropology and raising critical questions about the cultural assumptions that have confined it in the past. The New Historicism has in essence
made literary criticism the instrument of the ethnography or archaeology of
modernity by treating literary texts as cultural artifacts. While the work discussed below sometimes examines imaginative literature in this way, it mostly
relies on other kinds of sources, treating laws, legal arguments, legal decisions,
and institutions as artifacts. But our proposal is not just that legal phenomena
be viewed as cultural artifacts or "social texts" like any others; it is that legal
forms and legal processes play a compositional role in modem culture. That is,
cultural criticism must attend to the legal dimension of culture or remain
superficial.
A familiar view of law in modem society presumes that the coercive force
of the state must be justified by consent: the consent of individuals to private
arrangements or the consent of populations to public policies. Legal judgment,
then, polices the disputed boundaries between public and private, mine and
2. See GuYoRA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRmCISMS OF LAW (forthcoming 1998);
Guyora Binder, Institutions and Linguistic Conventions: The Pragmatismof Lieber's Hermeneutics, 16
CARDozo L. REv. 2169 (1996); Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the
Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989); Guyora Binder, What's Left, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1985
(1991) [hereinafter Binder, What's Left]; Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicialArtist:Statutes and
the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1983); Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise,
1 YAt J.L. & HUM. 1 (1988).
3. See generally CULTURAL STUDIES (Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson & Paula Treichler eds.,

1992).
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thine, consent and coercion. The fundamental operation of law is to identify
legal persons, entitlements, and preferences; when law has identified all of
these, it has fully represented society. In this view of law, authority is vested
solely in human will, and it is the essentially mimetic task of law to reflect and
enforce that will.
Much critical scholarship in law accepts the premise that law should mimic
social will, but then argues that law either does not or cannot do so. It is argued
that the lines between public and private, mine and thine, and consent and coercion are arbitrary and not based in consent. Accordingly, it is the personal
interests or contestable value judgments of officials, not social will, that resolve
legal disputes. The only defense against this official discretion is a system of
formal rules. Yet, the argument continues, these rules yield arbitrary results.
By blinding legal decision-makers to nuances of social context, rule formalism
achieves results that popular will would reject as irrational; it distorts or ignores
the preferences of affected parties and presents this indifference to its human
consequences as a virtue.
This style of criticism courts the twin dangers of skepticism and sentimentalism. Criticism is egregiously skeptical when it treats practices as presumptively illegitimate unless they rest on a foundation of epistemological certainty.
Since subjective judgment and reductive formalism are both useful tools of
practical reasoning, they should not by themselves discredit legal decisionmaking. Criticism is egregiously sentimental when it assumes that subjective judgment and reductive formalism, even if necessary to practical reasoning, are
always inappropriate when applied to human beings. How human beings
should be represented in social thought is a pressing moral question, but
whether they should be represented is not. Criticism that can be dismissed as
egregiously skeptical or sentimental ill serves the values that motivate it.
The dangers of skepticism and sentimentality are endemic to criticism that
accepts the mimetic ideal of law as an accurate depiction of social will. But it
only makes sense to criticize law for inaccurately representing individual or
collective preferences if preferences have a determinate character independent
of their legal representations. A more sophisticated and less fragile critique
recognizes that social will is not independent of legal representation. Individual preferences depend on socially conferred identities and socially distributed
resources; collective preferences depend on the method by which they are measured and the order in which alternatives are posed. Because all of these conditions affecting preferences are themselves influenced by law, law cannot simply
reflect but must also help compose society and its characters.
Thus, the legal representation of social will bears little resemblance to scientific observation. It is more like the literary representation of generic themes
such as "the pastoral" and "the sublime," familiar myths such as Faust and Don
Juan, or stock characters such as Athena and the hard-boiled gumshoe. Like
preferences, none of these entities exists independent of its representations.
These representations are judged aesthetically rather than epistemologically:
They are judged according to the experience they enable rather than their truth
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to experience. So too can we judge law aesthetically, according to the society it
forms, the identities it defines, the preferences it encourages, and the subjective
experience it enables. We can "read" and criticize law as part of the making of
a culture.
In this essay we expound such a cultural criticism of law. In our view,
critical scholarship treats law as a dimension of culture in so far as it: (1) views
law as an arena for the performance and contestation of representations of self
and as an influence on the roles and identities available to groups and individuals in portraying themselves; (2) interprets self-portrayal as an endeavor that,
whatever its instrumental pay-offs, also has aesthetic and expressive import; (3)
treats the interests and preferences that motivate instrumental action as dependent upon the identities actors assume.
In this essay we will consider examples of cultural representation in two
sorts of legal settings. First, we will review scholarship reading representations
of parties in a number of disputes-the Chicago Seven trial, the Klaus Barbie
war crimes trial, trials of Catholics in seventeenth-century England, the appellate case of Bowers v. Hardwick, the Mashpee Indian lands trial, and medieval
Icelandic blood feuds. These disputes took on expressive meaning for various
parties against a background of legal norms regulating or recognizing statuses
and identities. These norms enabled actors to define themselves and one another, or to subvert those definitions.
Second, we will consider examples of the representation of character,
credit, and value in commercial and financial law. The premise of this discussion is that commercial capitalism is not only a system of economics, but also a
system of representation. Deploying resources for production depends upon
the cultural work of representing them as commodities, while disposing of what
is produced depends upon the cultural work of creating the characters who will
make investment and consumption decisions. We will begin with ethnographies of exchange in a precommercial society and in a traditional society experiencing modernization. We will proceed through an account of the cultural
conditions for the emergence of lending at interest and bankruptcy in early
modem England, to a consideration of the cultural significance of the emergence of new forms of intangible property in nineteenth-century America. We
will find that the legal forms of wealth and exchange mark the shifting, often
contested boundaries between community and commerce, between intrinsic and
instrumental worth.
These examples inform our conclusion that law neither reflects nor distorts
a social world of subjects that exists independent of it. Instead, law helps compose the social world: It is implicated both in degrading and commodifying
once-sacred spheres of cultural value, and in making new values. Law, then, is
best criticized not for what it mimes or disguises or conserves or destroys, but
for what it fails to create.
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THEORETICAL SOURCES FOR CULTURAL CRICISM OF LAW

We will begin by explicating a range of theoretical sources that can inform
a cultural criticism of law. These will include Clifford Geertz's account of the
emerging interdisciplinarity in the humanities and social sciences; Nietzsche's
account of self-development as an aesthetic project; Foucault's account of
modern individuality as a projection of institutional power; Pierre Bourdieu's
accounts of practical action as cultural improvisation, and of aesthetic taste as
the pursuit of "symbolic power"; and Stephen Greenblatt's treatment of artistic
creativity as an "exchange" of "energy" between the economic and symbolic
orders. These fragments of theory converge on an understanding of modem
social order as dependent on culture; of culture as centrally concerned with the
representation of persons, populations, and institutions; and of the representation of persons, populations, and institutions as a way of illuminating social and
moral values. With this view of culture in mind, we hope to "read" legal representations of society critically, but neither skeptically nor sentimentally.
A.

Interdisciplinarity

That law can be read as a literary text is a helpful claim only if it tells us
something about law or literature we did not already know. Connecting disparate forms of discourse illuminates only when it engenders new answers by
bringing different questions into view.
Our general assumption is that fertile interdisciplinary study entails discomfiture. Hailing the "blurring" of generic lines between the social sciences and
humanities, Clifford Geertz has argued that the application of the methods or
premises of one discipline to another seems necessarily "discomposing."
It is discomposing not only because who knows where it all will end, but because as the idiom of social explanation, its inflections and its imagery,
changes, our sense of what constitutes such explanation, why we want it, and
how it relates to other sorts of things we value changes as well. It is not just
theory or 4method or subject matter that alters, but the whole point of the
enterprise.
Geertz notes that much social theory of behavior, formerly cast in causal and
supposedly scientific terms, has recently been getting rewrought as game theory or dramaturgy: Society according to these interpretations is less a machine
than "a serious game, a sidewalk drama, or a behavioral text."5 The aggregations of human conduct that make up the world of the social scientist-class
interests, efficient markets, and the like-are, to use the ubiquitous academic
platitude, "cultural constructs" that inform social action as well as social research. In discerning patterns in social behavior or cultural practice, the scholar
does not misapprehend them as irreducible constraints or irresistible forces of
locomotion. For Geertz, they are neither the way the world really is, nor
merely regulative fictions. Rather, they are collectively invented and repro4. Cru~oRt GEERITz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 8 (1983).
5. Id. at 23.
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duced contexts for assuming certain social roles. By focusing on how social
actors conceive of and model society, cultural analyses of society force social
scientists to look back up the barrel of the microscope at themselves.
But if this sort of social/textual analysis unnerves the social scientist, it
simultaneously frustrates the humanist who believes in willed and idealistic
individual conduct. 6 Reinterpreted as roleplaying, the exercise of moral choice
or aesthetic sensibility is reduced to involuntary participation in ritual, or cynical posing. As Geertz says in a passage particularly relevant to the law and
literature enterprise, the reconstruction of standard explanations of behavior
"sits rather poorly with traditional humanistic pieties."'7 As the fundamental
assumptions of one discipline become reconstructed according to the assumptions of another, the first discipline loses some of its gravity and independence.
The lesson of Geertzian interdisciplinarity is that law and literature scholarship ought to constitute an experiment in rebuilding the aesthetic in legal terms
or the legal in aesthetic terms. 8 It might show how literary apprehensions of
social or psychological reality borrow from the legal apprehension of social and
psychological reality. Or, it might show some symbiosis or conspiracy between the legal control of political energy and the cultural forms of imaginative
meaning-making we normally associate with the literary. Whatever the specific insights, the value of such research resides not in any confirmation of the
power of a single method to subject an ever broader domain of data to a sovereign theory, but in an artful disjunction of method and data to illuminate a
particular society's images of and beliefs about itself. In this way, interdisciplinary interrogation, in Geertz's terms, should not establish an interdisciplinary
fraternity, but offer instead "a sea change in our notion not so much of what
knowledge is but of what it is we want to know." 9
As New Historicist literary critic Stephen Greenblatt has said, literature
functions within a culture in three ways: "as a manifestation of the concrete
behavior of its particular author, as itself the expression of the codes by which
behavior is shaped, and as a reflection upon those codes." 10 If literary criticism
limits itself to the analysis of any one of these functions, it risks various forms
of reductionism. A reading of the first sort, for example, might deteriorate into
isolated literary biography. The second sort of reading can devolve into vulgar
ideological "superstructure" analysis. The third risks a drift into extreme detachment, sacrificing a sense of art's concrete role in culture in the name of dry
timeless verities.1 Greenblatt's alternative, which he calls a "more cultural or
anthropological criticism,"' 12 addresses all of these functions and rests on a few
basic convictions:
6. See id. at 26.

7. Id.at 25.
8. See id. at 21-22.
9. Id. at 34.
10. STEPHmN GRENBLATT, RENAissAc

(1980).
11. See Id.
12. Id.

SELF-FAsHIONnGo: FROM MoRE To SHAX-SPAP.

4
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that men are born "unfinished animals," that the facts of life are less artless
than they look, that both particular cultures and the observers of these cultures

are inevitably drawn to a metaphorical grasp of reality, [and] that anthropological interpretation must address itself less to the mechanics of customs and institutions than to the13interpretive constructions the members of a society apply to
their experiences.
Thus Greenblatt strives both to avoid effacing authorial inventiveness, and to
avoid idealizing that inventiveness as a quality discontinuous with practical social life. The author's inventiveness becomes an exemplar of the inventiveness
immanent in much social interaction not ordinarily distinguished as "aesthetic."
When we examine legal texts in this spirit
their significance for us is not that we may see through them to underlying and
prior historical principles but rather that we may interpret the interplay of their
symbolic structures with those perceivable in the careers of their authors and in
the larger social world as constituting a single, complex process of self-fashioning and, through this interpretation, come closer to understanding how literary and social identities were formed in this culture. That is, we are able to
achieve a concrete apprehension of the consequences for human expression-for
the 'T'-of a specific form of power, power at once localized in particular
institutions-the court, the church, the colonial administration, the patriarchal
family-and diffused in ideological structures14 of meaning, characteristic modes
of expression, recurrent narrative pattems.
The natural focus of such cultural criticism is imaginative literature, since
"[a]mong artists the will to be the culture's voice-to create the abstract and
brief chronicles of the time-is a commonplace." 15 Nevertheless, Greenblatt
notes that "the same will may extend beyond art." 1 6 Literature, then, "does not

pretend to autonomy" because it is part of our everyday practice of representing
and interpreting our social surroundings.' 7 This is true not only in the sense
that the "construction" of a social situation requires inventiveness, but also in
the sense that what we do not invent we appropriate from literary convention.
Thus we "read" our social surroundings with the help of familiar plots, characters, and sensibilities.
B.

Self-Creation and Cultural Criticism

Many of the major theorists of culture who dwell in the world of
postmodernism owe much to Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, which joins together a hermeneutic ontology, a vitalist aesthetics, and a perfectionist ethics.
We can start with Nietzsche's carefully hedged perspectivism, and his central
argument that the world is sensibly viewed as a text subject to aesthetic
interpretation.' 8
13.

l

14. Id at 5-6.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id.

17. Id.
18. The interpretation of Nietzsche offered here draws especially on
Nm-zscHD: Luma As LrrRAruRE (1985).

ALExANDER NEHAMAS,
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To describe the world as an interpreted text is not to say it has essential
features that are hidden or distorted by human interpretation. Rather, according
to Nietzsche's perspectivism, it is that by itself the world has no features at all,
so that there is nothing to represent, rightly or wrongly. The apparent world is
not distinct from reality, but is simply the world as it appears to any being that
needs to survive in it and who must arrange it selectively for her own purposes.
All perception is selective and aesthetic, so to try to grasp everything is to grasp
nothing.' 9
Perspectivism is not the same as relativism, which implies that multiple
equally true claims can be made about the same object. Nietzsche insists that
no particular point of view is epistemologically superior in the sense of affording those who occupy it a better picture of the world as it really is; but his
20
position does not imply that all points of view are equally valuable.
For Nietzsche, the phenomenon of human will is like all other things in the
world-an interpretation. Subjectivity is merely the "sum of its effects"; it is
not a given or an essence but rather a fiction made of the acts of one person, or
many. 21 In this sense, to ascribe causal will or motivation-to one's self, to
other persons, or to an institution or group-is to invent a literary character.
Like a character in fiction or drama, a person is simply the sum of all the things
she does or says. The character is related to each of her statements or actions
not as substance to attribute but as whole to part. And the same is true for any
person or institution to which we ascribe identity. Ascribing identity to the
disparate acts of one or more persons means writing a narrative fiction, a "genealogy" that identifies a motivated character with origins and obligations,
grievances and grudges, unfulfilled quests and unpaid debts. 22
Nietzsche called the practices and beliefs of our culture "interpretation" because every view of the world enables and is enabled by a particular kind of life
and therefore presupposes and manifests particular values and interests. For
Nietzsche, it is not that the world is indeterminate, but that it has a diversity of
people who cannot all live by the same values. Philosophy's goal, then, is to
help us become more self-conscious about our selectivity, more aware of the
contingency of what we see or the way we live.23 The point of this self-consciousness is to place in question not the truth of what we see, but the value of
that way of seeing. If one comes to see one's own sensibility as impoverished
or boorish, the appropriate response is to change the way one lives. Thus,
philosophy is used not to escape the perspectival limits inherent in living, but to
19. See id. at 42 ("Facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations.") (quoting Fum cH
NmTzscHm, THE Wu.L To PowEa 481 (Walter Kaufman & RJ.Hollingdale trans., Vintage Press 1968)

(1887)).

20. See idat 3.
21. See id. at 74-105.
22. Ia at 103-105.
23. In noting that certain ascetic ideals are present in the lives of "all the great, fruitful, inventive
spirits," Nietzsche maintains that these people do not see these ideals as duties or virtues, but rather as
"the most appropriate and natural conditions of their best existence." Id. at 116 (quoting FRIEDRICH
NmTZSCHs., ON THE GENEAoGY oF MoRA~s 8 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage
Press 1968) (1887)).
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enhance our capacity to choose the limits within which we will live, and our
choice. It is this self-shaping capacity that Nietzsche
responsibility for that
24
refers to as power.
Much of the postmodernism and poststructuralism that derives from Nietzsche insists that just as we must challenge the assumption of a tangible world of
objects that the human "subject" can examine, we must also challenge the even
more basic assumption of a bounded and definable subject. As Alexander
Nehamas notes, much modem thought after Nietzsche accepts this challenge,
but in such a way as to underscore that the "aesthetic" project of making a
consciousness for oneself is a thoroughly ethical act. For Nietzsche, aesthetics
and ethics are aspects of the single enterprise of valuemaking. All normative
issues ultimately translate into the question of how individuals compose themselves as subjects of their actions and experiences, a part of the more general
material formation of humanity.
The quality and originality of sensibility that individuals bring to the interpretation of their world is, for Nietzsche, an urgent ethical question. This gives
literature and the other imaginative arts a special ethical and political significance. First, in so far as reading literature is interpretive activity, it is one
occasion for expressing and developing an interpretive sensibility.2 In this respect reading literature is continuous with the rest of life. But literature and the
other imaginative arts are also ethical models for living in so far as they manifest such virtues as originality, aesthetic value, self-discipline, and artistic integrity. 26 The ethical reader is obliged to compose herself in such a way as to
be open to the ethical lesson literature teaches. This entails a capacity to appreciate the virtues it manifests-an emotional capacity to be inspired to emulate
them and the requisite imaginative capacity to emulate the work's originality
rather than to merely imitate the work's sensibility. This cognitive capacity
required of the ethical reader includes sufficient acculturation to appreciate how
an author works within generic traditions, and also the ways in which the author works with and on these traditions to articulate an original sensibility. The
literary work's role in revising or criticizing its own cultural origins provides a
model for normative inventiveness in the conduct of a life. Creating new values always means critically elaborating a culture while continuing a narrative
fiction. This must be done in a way that transforms what came before, yet in
retrospect, seems necessary and inevitable.2 7
Nietzsche's location of the artistic sensibility and the artistic work within a
larger culture gives his value theory a political dimension. But in approaching
Nietzsche's politics we must avoid being misled by his celebration of "power."
For Nietzsche, "power" is not a political term at all, but an ethical and aesthetic
one. Nietzschean power is personal, not interpersonal. Ceding power to others
is an ethical violation; in this, Nietzsche anticipated and inspired the Sartrean
24. See, e.g., id. at 70-125.
25. See id at 90-91.

26. See id. at 193-99, 226-28.
27. See id at 95-98, 111-13.
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critique of collaboration with authority. And it perverts power to render it
political.
Nietzsche's own political ideas are bound up with his understanding of the
contrast between classical and modem society. In classical Greece, a harmonious and homogeneous culture provided a structured path to collective participation in virtue. Public rhetoric and theater not only taught virtue but engaged the
public in its ceremonial enactment. Tragedy, in particular, authoritatively expressed what it meant to be Athenian, so that it was able to establish the collective understanding necessary for deliberating about an authentically collective
good. 28 This shared understanding allowed political deliberation to refine and
realize the capabilities not of the individual participants but of the polity itself.
Tragedy used emotion to identify its audience with an exemplary self. The
tragic hero is challenged by fate, but-with the vicarious participation of the
audience-nobly maintains a stable self in the face of suffering. 29 The shared
public experience of contradiction evoked by tragedy, a contradiction not just
of propositions but of feelings, was the source of its power to instruct, provoke,
and ennoble. 30 Nietzsche saw Socrates as the archenemy of this fertile antinomianism, bent on banishing the experience of contradiction to the realm of
appearance and positing an invisible world of eternal verity in its place. 3 1 In
Nietzsche's eyes, this disastrous separation of philosophy from poetry purported to relieve suffering by making "reality" an escape from the apparent
world, yet it diminished human life by denying the validity of passion. Platonic
idealism would spawn what was, for Nietzsche, the catastrophe of Christian
world denial, and start humanity down the slide from classical virtue to petty
bourgeois respectability.
In modem society, Nietzsche maintained, the civic inculcation of virtue was
no longer possible. The world was disenchanted, and authoritative cultural values could no longer keep or deserve the allegiance of the self-respecting. But
the tragic consequence of this disenchantment was that the self could no longer
gain stability through consensus and ritual. Thus the dislocations attendant
upon modernization not only imposed suffering, but also stripped the self of its
acculturated capacity to survive suffering. Liberalism collaborated in this spiritual atrocity, because in the name of neutrality and tolerance it relegated the
self to a realm of private taste insulated from any societal concem.3 2 Nor could
political authoritarianism substitute for the lost cultural authority of virtue:
Nietzsche rejected the power politics of Bismarck precisely because Bismarck
used political means to secure nonpolitical ends, and thus left the world in a
state of dispirited disenchantment. 33 Only art, not politics, could recover virtue
in the wake of modernization.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id. at 42-43.
See id at 119.
See id.
See id. at 212-13.
See Tracy Strong, Nietzsche's PoliticalAesthetics, in NmIrzscm's NEw SEAs: ExPLORATIONS

INPHILOSOPHY, AEsTHEncs, AND POLITICS 160-163 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Tracy B. Strong eds.,

1990).
33. See id. at 160.
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The virtue attainable in modem society was, however, a different kind of
virtue. Instead of being the collective achievement of a culture defined by a
shared sensibility, modem virtue was the personal achievement of power, and
the creative artist was its paradigm. Yet the pursuit of artistic virtue still required a conducive culture-one with rich common traditions, discerning audiences, and above all, other ambitious artists. The cultural function of art was
no longer the inculcation of an authoritative and collective identity, but the
provocation of others to fashion distinctive sensibilities of their own. The heroic figure of the artist replaced the tragic hero as the icon of virtue, and the
aspiration to recreate the culture replaced the aspiration to exemplify it.
The political dimension of Nietzsche's value theory lies in his concern for
the cultural conditions of artistic creation and hence self-creation. While virtue
was no longer common, the conditions of its exercise remained a common
good. By developing and expressing a powerful sensibility one contributed to
the common good; remaining indifferent to the self-demeaning complacency of
others detracted from it. In this sense, cultural criticism was a political obligation in modem society. The mutual provocation provided by artistic self-expression and cultural criticism was the modem equivalent of deliberative
politics.
Although repulsed by authoritarianism, Nietzsche was unconcerned with
the liberal problem of regulating the encounters of independent selves to minimize tyranny. From a Nietzschean perspective, this liberal project is pointless
unless we have meaningful selves in the first place. The crucial question is not
how to protect the self from invasion, but how to strengthen the self's capacity
to define and defend its own boundaries; not how we can preserve ourselves,
but what kind of selves we ought to possess.
Nietzsche's virtue-driven value theory may seem perfectionist, but the
charge that he would have approved enslaving the many to produce one perfect
work of art is a caricature. Nietzsche's concern was human virtue, not artistic
merit-the art of living rather than the work of art. Whether human virtue is
optimally distributed according to a principle of maximizing the average level
of virtue in society, or the virtuousness of the most virtuous, or of the least
virtuous, he neither said nor cared. Nietzsche was concerned with the "revaluation of all values," not their scaling and measurement. 34 The accounting questions that obsess welfare economists and theorists of justice, the debates over
maximean, maximin and maximax, would no doubt have struck Nietzsche as
symptoms of a shopkeeper's morality.
C.

Postmodern Social Theory: Discipline and Practice

Contemporary cultural criticism may be thought of as extending Nietzsche's perspectivism more fully into the social sphere, where we find collective
acts of identity formation. Cultural history, then, focuses on the complex
34. FRIDRicH Nm-zscHE, Ecce Homo, in BASIC WRITINGs oF NmrzscmE 782 (Walter Kaufmann

ed. & trans., 1968).
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evolution of these social characters, viewing them as artistic creations that also
provide highly pragmatic solutions to political and economic problems.
In The Passions and the Interests,35 economist Albert Hirschman reviews
how early capitalist society "invented" a new human figure, the rationally "interested" man, whose preferences became the foundational elements of utilitarianism and capitalism. 3 6 For Foucault, this interest-bearing person was the
creature and instrument of a new disciplinary society. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault identifies the new "human sciences" of the modem period as "disciplines" in that they discipline both the investigator and the object of
investigation. 37 Disciplines are techniques of examining populations under
controlled conditions that render them comparable, thereby defining them as
objects not only of knowledge but also of evaluation and regulation. 38 We can
extend Hirschman by saying that to impose the instinct for preferences on people is to discipline them, if economically productive "interest" constrains the
destructive passions. But "interest" solves another problem as well: Interest is
socially useful because it ensures predictable behavior. The predictable interests of others provide a determinate social environment within which to pursue
one's own interests. Thus, interest solves an epistemological problem as well
as an ethical one. If modem justifications for the exercise of power impose the
need to measure the social world, the concept of interest gives us something to
measure. In regulating behavior, interest provides the human sciences with the
controlled conditions against which interests can be measured.
To New Historicists, however, Foucault's "disciplinary" account of the "interested" subject leaves out the crucial dimension of human agency. In Foucault's view, power does not exercise itself through individual human action or
large state institutions, but is instead diffused through particular disciplinary
mechanisms. 39 Moreover, the disciplinary mechanisms create characters or social roles to which we now must aspire (the normal child, the healthy body, the
stable and obedient mind) and other deviant personas we must vigilantly
avoid.40 Foucault offers histories of the modes by which these social subjects
have been made, by which we see the fault lines between the norms which are
proper subjects and the deviations which are ruled out of order.
35. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: PoIrnCAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977).
36. Id. at 32; see also id. at 32-44, 48-52, 65-66.
37. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 137-138 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975)
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH]; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS:
AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 344-45 (1970) [hereinafter FOULCAULT, THE ORDER OF
THINGS].
38. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 37, at 135-41, 170-77. For Foucault's

study of philology, biology and political economy, see FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, supra note
137.

For his examination of psychology, see FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 37;

MIcHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Random House 1978) (1976),
and MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON

(Richard Howard trans., Random House 1965) (1961). For his discussion of medicine, see MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Random House 1973) (1963).
39. See FOUCAULT, DiscIPLNE AND PUNISH, supra note 37, at 135-169.
40. See id. at 170-184.
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For Foucault, the individuality conferred on persons by disciplinary investigation is merely a bureaucratic text-a dossier, case history, or transcript. Recognizing themselves as objects of bureaucratic knowledge, persons interpret
their own experience and measure their own worth according to the generic
conventions of the human sciences. They author themselves only in the sense
that they sign their names to scripted confessions. As Pauline Rosenan points
out, postmodernists tend to view the human subject as a mere effigy, a "construct," a linguistic invention. 4 1 Foucault's discussion of power tends to omit
any language of intention or purpose, while anthropomorphizing power itself.
We see local manifestations of power, but this power is never held or exercised
by anyone in particular. We are encouraged to assume, though never told, that
behind these manifestations lies a coherent force that transcends them.
By contrast to Foucault's disciplinary analysis, the New Historicist emphasizes the role of creativity in fashioning subjectivity. In a New Historicist analysis, individuals or groups typically deploy aesthetic skill in concocting a
motivated self, an identity. This character, though often treated as a fixed determinant, is in fact endlessly renegotiated to meet changing circumstances. A
New Historicist approach to law would seek the act of express creation in what,
for "human scientists" 4 2 such as economists and policy analysts, is the mere
manifestation of fixed preferences.
A more elaborate theoretical foundation for this enterprise may be sought in
the anthropology of Pierre Bourdieu,4 3 who has tried to reincorporate human
action into the field of social forces without reviving the notion of an "authentic" or presocial human subject. For Bourdieu, social practice is a generative,
organizing scheme, an imprecise but systematic principle of selection and realization, tending, through steadily directed adjustments and corrections, to eliminate errors and to conserve even fortuitous successes.
44
The key to understanding human action for Bourdieu is the "habitus."
The habitus consists of (1) a repertoire of behaviors and gestures developed as
a result of either deliberate inculcation, imitation, or random processes of trial
and error; (2) dispositions to so behave in response to certain situations; (3) the
ability to interpret situations as calling for such behaviors; (4) experience deploying these behaviors with more or less success in unfamiliar situations; (5)
experience modifying such behaviors in unfamiliar situations; and (6) a repertoire of goals the actor experiences as appropriate and attainable for someone
like herself.45 The temporal urgency of action limits practice to this repertoire
of familiar behaviors, ends, and strategies of adaptation. This means that there
is an automatic quality even to such apparently reflective choices as undertak41. PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 42-43 (1992).
42. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, supra note 37, at 344-45.
43. See PIERE BouRDIEu, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., Cambridge

Univ. Press 1977) (1972).
44. Id. at 72.

45. See id. at 72-95; PImRR BouRDmu, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 66-79 (Richard Nice trans., Polity Press 1990) (1980).
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ing a feasibility study, comparison shopping, checking the weather report, or
sacrificing a rook.
The habitus is the residue of an individual's experience through which she
has absorbed the accumulated experience of many others. 4 6 Practice involves
bringing it to bear on a current situation for which it may be ill-adapted. "Only
in imaginary experience.., does the social world take the form of a universe of
possibles equally possible for any possible subject." 47 Thus the habitus represents an individual or "subjective" factor in the analysis of social action, but the
individuality consists as much in a confining quirkiness as in any freedom of
maneuver. For while the habitus enables some choice and creative adaptation,
it is also the repository of past socialization or "discipline."
That practical activity is organized by the habitus implies that practical intelligence may be very different from the calculating rationality that economic
theory ascribes to actors. Indeed, Bourdieu argues that economic rationality
should itself be seen as a habitus: a set of coping skills peculiar to certain social
groups, arising only out of the requisite socializing experiences, and sustainable
only in the requisite life situation. As Bourdieu explains:
Economic theory which acknowledges only the rational 'responses' of an indeterminate, interchangeable agent to 'potential opportunities' ... converts the
immanent law of the economy into a universal norm of proper economic behaviour. In so doing, it conceals the fact that the 'rational' habitus which is the
precondition for appropriate economic behaviour is the product of [a] particular economic condition, the one defined by the possession of the economic and
cultural capital required in order to seize the 'potential opportunities' theoretically available to all ... .48
Bourdieu's practical actor may pursue any number of ends. But if there is a
common motivation driving individuals along the tracks laid by socialization, it
is honor rather than greed. Thus practical action is at base less reflective, more
ritualistic, and more idealistic than rational choice models would suggest. In
the right social milieu, however, the pursuit of esteem can certainly habituate
actors to economic rationality.
Bourdieu's focus on the decisionmaking of the practical actor gives him a
more flexible model of social order than that offered by structuralists like Foucault. Since there is always a gap between the conditions under which the actor
was habituated and the context which calls for urgent practical action, social
orders do not function smoothly. The actor is always, to some extent, in the
position of a judge trying to apply archaic rules to novel circumstances. Moreover, because all participants in a social order are in the same position, no actor
can ever be sure how other actors will respond. Practical actors are habituated
to cope with this uncertainty and to expect variation in both the responses of
46. See Boupmmu, supra note 43, at 72 (defining "habitus" as "systems of durable, transposable
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures") (internal citation

omitted).
47. BouRwmu, supra note 45, at 64.

48. Il at 63-64.
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others and the judgments of observers as to which responses are socially
appropriate.
The job of the critic, in understanding social practice, is not to "decode" its
symbolism but to restore its practical necessity by relating it to the conditions
of its genesis. That any choice can be accounted for retroactively does not
mean perfect predictability, because even the strictest rituals leave room for
strategies. Thus, social practice does not have the rulelike quality of a juridical
code. Nevertheless, customary norms can order and constrain practice, because
when one judges another she marshals schemes of perception and appreciation
more or less operative in the habitus of other participants in the practice.
Even where the agents' habitus are perfectly harmonized and apparently
predictable, outcome uncertainty remains as long as the sequence of the agents'
reciprocal actions is incomplete. Bourdieu's model of the interaction that is
structured but nevertheless colored with narrative uncertainty is the gift exchange. 49 Here, the very conventions of the practice preclude an immediate
and in-kind reciprocation of the gift, imposing on the recipient of a gift a per50
haps unwanted discretion to choose the moment and currency of response.
This gives the practice of gift exchange a gamelike quality, in which the moves
are "ruled" by strategy, not rule. 51 Bourdieu's image of a social practice in
which the application of rules unfolds over time, as a process involving discretion and the possibility of subversion by multiple actors, is applicable to
52
processes of legal decision.
Indeed, Bourdieu is particularly interested in practices like law, where decision-making discretion is vested in office. By virtue of their office, particular
decisionmakers exercise a personal power that, because it is not reducible to
force or wealth, is "symbolic," i.e., an effect of meaning. Official authority, in
other words, marks a formal boundary within a culture, a sphere of power relatively autonomous from other spheres. 53 Because there exist such relatively
autonomous spheres, governed by mechanisms capable of imposing their necessity on agents, those who are in a position to command these mechanisms
are able to dispense with strategies aimed expressly and directly at domination.
Strategies such as law, aimed at formally regulating a field of practice, "transmute 'egoistic,' private, particular interests . . . into disinterested, collective,
'5 4
publicly avowable, legitimate interests."
For Bourdieu, the role of law is to "symbolically consecrate . . . power
relation[s] between groups and classes" by recording them in a form which
anchors them securely to other power relations, eliminating the practical utility
of perceiving them as contingent or contestable. 55 Agents bind each other into
simultaneously enabling and confining roles which preclude the exhibition of
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See BouRmiu, supra note 43, at 4-8; BoUm.Dru, supra note 45, at 98-111, 126.
See Bouimmu, supra note 43, at 4-8, 171-74; BouiREiU, supra note 45, at 98-111, 126.
See Bourmmu, supra note 43, at 6.
See Boui.Diu, supra note 45, at 98-111.
See Bou.mwu, supra note 43, at 41-42; Boumnmu, supra note 45, at 108-10, 238-39.
Bou.mmu, supra note 43, at 40.

55. Id. at 188.
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naked self-interest by clothing them with the interests of office. Thus, the symbolic or "legitimating" role of law is to prettify or obscure domination with the
veil of enchanted relationships. 56 Of course, whether the authority of office
will be recognized on a given occasion or resisted is always a matter of suspense-its exercise is always a bet. This means that authoritative decisionmakers have a strategic
interest in conserving or enhancing their authority or
"symbolic capital."'5 7
Neither authority nor symbolic capital is confined to state officials. It is
vested in professionals by virtue of such practices as training and state certification, and is vested less securely-because less formally-in persons of high
social status. In a rigid caste society, the social status and symbolic authority of
each person might be clear. But in more fluid societies, certainly in modem
society, social status is always at risk and always negotiable. In bourgeois society, a struggle ensues to "distinguish" one's self as a subjectivity worthy of
decisionmaking competence by virtue of superior knowledge, refinement of
taste, or self-control. "Distinction" always places one at a distinct remove from
her origins or interests. It informs personal identity with the qualities of
58
office.
A number of propositions are implicit in Bourdieu's analysis of "symbolic
power" and "distinction." First, every social interaction has a competitive or
strategic dimension. Every interaction takes place within a general contest over
cultural authority. Second, the "disciplining" process in modem society does
not mechanically form actors but engages their active, avid participation. The
achievement of bourgeois subjectivity requires effort and luck. Third, the display of literacy, aesthetic refinement, and rhetorical skill are all means of staking a claim to "distinction," social status, and symbolic capital. The literary use
of language therefore has a practical, power-enhancing dimension.5 9 Fourth,
the exercise and conservation of power depend upon an aesthetic and dramaturgic activity of playing "characters" to an audience. Finally, the exercise of
authority is conditioned on both the social criteria for its exercise and the discretionary application of those criteria by particular social actors. In this sense,
conserving authority involves a negotiation or exchange of "symbolic capital"
with norms, institutions, and individuals. 60
Linguistic exchange ...is also an economic exchange which is established
within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed
with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is
capable of procuring a certain material or symbolic profit. In other words,
utterances are not only... signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also
signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated 6and
appreciated, and signs of author1
ity, intended to be believed and obeyed.

56. Id.
57. Id at 171.
58. See id. at 187-88.
59. See id. at 186-87.
60. See id. at 171-83.
61. PIERRE Bouitnmu, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC PowER 66 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., Polity Press 1991) (1982).
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Identifying a practical, strategic dimension of meaning in all aesthetic activity, and an aesthetic dimension in all practical action, brings power and culture,
law and literature, onto the same field of play.
D. New Historicism
The New Historicism is an intellectual movement that fulfills many of
Geertz's criteria for cultural criticism. 62 It is historical in the mundane sense
that it studies old cultures as well as contemporary ones. It is new in that it
draws on both conventional historical dimensions-most obviously political
and economic history-as well as more contemporary dimensions, such as social and ethnographic history. And it is relevant to law-as-literature in at least
two senses. First, in apprehending cultural forces that cut across the normal
dimensions, New Historicism sees individuals and groups in the virtually dramaturgic acts of suffering, exploiting, and renegotiating the identities and interests that channel their participation in political and economic life. Second, it
entertains the possibility that any social or political document can be read not
only instrumentally but also aesthetically, as describing the cultural forces that
underlie its production and as reinterpreting cultural forms and norms. Texts,
for the New Historicists, are both socially produced and socially productive.
Like any somewhat self-described new movement, New Historicism has
been prolix in its manifestoes, but citing a few key principles is helpful. The
New Historicism assumes that every expressive act by an individual or group is
embedded in a material network of practices; that every intellectual or political
critique inevitably uses the very tools it condemns; that there is no substantial
distinction between literary and nonliterary texts once they start circulating;
that no discourse yields eternal truth nor discovers eternal human nature; and
that any critical method under capitalism participates in the economy it critiques. 63 The New Historicism thus may often still use such formalist techniques
as analyses of allegory, irony, and mimesis. But contrary to the premises of
formalist criticism, it seeks to dissolve literature back into historical
complexity. 64
The New Historicism offers an anthropology similar to Bourdieu's. For
New Historicists, art is penetrated by its institutional context, ritual gestures,
patterns of relation, and shared images of authority. Even though art is demarcated from ordinary utterances, the demarcation itself is a social event and signals not the effacement of the social but its absorption into the work. 65 Art's
appeal to distant audiences does not signal its abstraction, but rather its incorporation of its social roots. Thus, art is the most fundamental trace of culture.
62. See Stephen Greenblatt, Towards a Poetics of Culture, in THE NEw HisTolucisM 1-14 (H.
Aram Veeser ed., 1989); see also BROOK THOMAS, THE NEw HisTolcisM AND OmR OhD-FAsmoNED
Topics 3-23 (1991) (providing a brief introduction to the goals of New Historicism).
63. See H. Aram Veeser, Introduction to THE NEw HiSTORiCiSM, supra note 62, at xi.
64. Greenblatt, supra note 62, at 11; Hayden White, New Historicism:A Comment, in Ti NEw
HIsToicisl, supra note 62, at 293-302.
65. See, e.g., STEPmE GEKENBLATr, SHAKESPEARIAN NEGOTIATIONS 4-5 (1988) (arguing that cultural and artistic practices are collectively produced in a society).
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Yet, at the same time, we best understand a culture by treating its supposedly
non-artistic products as if they were art; that is, we read all social texts in the
hope of finding the traces of their enabling social conditions, the traces that
instrumental forces have failed to efface entirely.
Given these traces, the method of the New Historicist is to question the
usual structures of history-whether linear, cyclical, or dialectical. Indeed, she
sees not so much history as histories,full of heterogeneity, contradiction, fragmentation, and difference. The New Historicist writes a history at once messier
and more inclusive than that supplied by nationalist historiography or modernization theory, finding throughout the course of a culture endless negotiations
and trade-offs of cultural currency. The New Historicism is interested in the
episodic, anecdotal, contingent, exotic, abjected, uncanny pieces of historythe ones that violate rules and laws of politics and social organization. 66 New
Historicists do not seek "raw" materials as does Levi-Strauss. 67 They seek the
"cooked" ones-the hidden cultural contrivances, not just the so-designated
works of art, but also related ceremonial practices that have been adduced ostensibly to illuminate works of art.
One reason why New Historicism can apply aesthetic criteria to things normally thought of as outside the realm of art is that it rejects any simple mimetic
notion of art. Yet at the same time that it rejects mere mimesis, New Historicism rejects any new-critical view of the art work as self-sufficient. Rather,
New Historicism considers art, like all cultural forms, as a medium for negotiating and exchanging 6 8-a point at which one cultural practice intersects with
another, borrowing its forms or attempting to ward off unwelcome appropriations or pressures. Art negotiates among "a class of creators, equipped with a
complex, communally shared repertoire of conventions. ' 69 Thus artists need a
currency, a grammar, and a vocabulary of literary forms, each with its systematic adjustments, symbol systems, and stereotype characters. 70 As Greenblatt
notes in a list of "abjurations" for his style of criticism:
1. There can be no appeals to genius as the sole origin of the energies of great
art.

2. There can be no motiveless creation.
3. There can be no transcendent or timeless or unchanging representation.
4. There can be no autonomous artifacts.
5. There can be no expression without an origin and an object, afrom and afor.
6. There can be no art without social energy.
71
7. There can be no spontaneous generation of social energy.
66. See, e.g., Gerald Graff, Co-optation,in TiH NEw HIsTomcISM, supra note 62, at 168-81 (arguing that leftist literary theorists espousing New Historicism must resign themselves to the potential
cooptation of New Historicism itself).
67. See CLAUDE LEvi-STRAuss, THE RAW AND THE CoorE: INTRODUCTION TO A SCIENCE OF

MYTHOLOGy I (John & Doreen Weightman trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1964).
68. See Greenblatt, supra note 62, at 12.
69. Id

70. See id
71. GREENBLATT, supra note 65, at 12.
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This artistic currency both draws on and contributes to the realms of religious ceremony, political argument, and economic transaction. For the New
Historicist, there is no logical connection between a theory and its political
consequences, or between any set of ideas and how they may be used in particular social contexts. The political valence of a theory does not inhere in the
theory itself (or idea or text or practice), but is conjunctural. For our purposes,
applying such a critical method to law means both that the law's supposedly
prosaic, instrumental process of weighing interests and defining entitlements is
a contested social process of self-definition, and that the law's literary legibility
in no way implies its refinement or transcendence of venality.
Because, almost by definition, its value turns so much on the specific topics
to which it applies, we can say little more about such criticism in the abstract.
But we can say something about how we might fruitfully develop cultural criticism of law. An analysis of law as social text will suggest itself wherever we
see legal thought as social thought. Inasmuch as jurisprudence was arguably a
central tradition of Western social thought before the development of academic
social science in the nineteenth century, 7 2 and inasmuch as progenitors of social science such as Madison, Bentham, and Lieber also profoundly influenced
American legal development, and inasmuch as legal decisionmakers in twentieth-century America have come to see themselves primarily as policy analysts,
social textualists will find themselves facing a crowded docket. In virtually any
dispute or transaction, they are likely to find actors construing, deploying, enacting, enforcing, or resisting representations of society.
We now proceed to consider several readings of legal interactions as social
texts. We will begin with a number of studies treating legal disputes as contests over how to represent society or its parts, expressive contests of meaning
rather than instrumental contests over resources. The disputes in question take
on expressive meaning for the participants against the background of bodies of
law that influence or recognize character, status, and identity. The criminal
law, for example, may determine guilt on the basis of assessments of the character or motives of an actor. The criminal law's purposes include the shaping
of behavior not only by punishing and deterring wrongdoing, but by educating
the public about norms. The criminal law thereby operates to define the lawabiding as well as the criminal character. 73 The civil law confers identity by
determining who has standing to sue for a wrong, who is damaged by it, who is
responsible for it. Traversing a social and moral terrain charged with legal
meaning, individuals and groups can define themselves and one another by
reference to legal norms. They can also attempt to challenge and subvert those
definitions, and the norms that confer them. We will see actors pursuing these
strategies in both criminal and civil trials, in constitutional litigation and political advocacy, and in such informal disputing behavior as the blood feud.
72. See, e.g., DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEAsuRE: SoCIAL THouGH-I m THE WEsTHmR
LEGAL TRADImoN 252-75 (1990) (tracing how law was overpowered by philosophy and the social sciences in the nineteenth century).

73. See text accompanying notes 74-163 infra.
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CULTURAL READINGS OF

DisPuTEs

The Drama of Civil Rites

A relatively simple example of a reading of law as a dynamic of cultural
representations concerns the criminal trial. What is at stake in a criminal trial?
A literary criticism of law would find more than a conventional resolution of
guilt or innocence. The criminal trial is as much a social ritual as a legal instrument, valuable in part because it can affirm many values at once. Indeed, the
criminal trial is perhaps the central trope of law. Half a century ago, Thurman
Arnold captured this idea in an essay in his aptly titled book, The Symbols of
Government:
For most persons, the criminal trial overshadows all other ceremonies as a
dramatization of the values of our spiritual government, representing the dignity of the State as an enforcer of law, and at the same time the dignity of the
individual when he is an avowed opponent of the State, a dissenter, a radical,
or even a criminal. So important is the criminal trial to the whole ideological
structure of government that its disappearance in favor of an efficient and
speedy way of accomplishing the incarceration of persons supposed to be dangerous to the social order, is always a sign of psychological instability of a
people.7 4
If viewed functionally, the criminal trial, Arnold argues, is inherently a failure.75 He asserts that the rules of evidence are a woefully inefficient tool of
investigation, the definitions of criminal responsibility rarely accord with sensible psychology, and the criminal sentence often fails to serve any social purpose. 76 But all this may be irrelevant since
the only function which the criminal trial can perform is to express currently
held ideals about crime and about trials. It can act as a brake against a popular
hysteria which insists upon following any one of the ideals to its logical conclusion.... Obviously, therefore, the public administration of criminal justice
is not a method of controlling crime. It is rather one of the problems which
must be faced by those who desire to control crime. Without the drama of the
criminal trial, it is difficult to imagine on77just what institution we would hang
our conflicting ideals of public morality.
How can we "read" a trial to discover the social forms, rituals, and mechanisms of meaning that underlie its apparent function? How can a trial be a
social text? One excellent example of such a cultural interpretation of a legal
78
event appears in John Murray Cuddihy's jaunty book, The Ordealof Civility.
Cuddihy's overall theme is to note the not very coincidental fact that many
major modernist thinkers were Jewish. He reinterprets the works of such
figures as Freud, Marx, and Levi-Strauss, not in the scientific terms in which
74. THURMAN W.

ARNOLD,

THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 130 (1935).

See id at 146.
See id.
Id at 147-48.
JOHN MURRAY CUDDIHY, THE ORDEAL OF CrvuTr: FREuD, MARx, Lv-STRAuss,
JEWISH STRuGOLE WITH MODERNITY (1974).
75.
76.
77.
78.

AND THE
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of Jewish subversive uprising
they were written, but rather as an expression
79
against the demands of Anglo-Saxon civility.
The general phenomenon of "Jewish theory" is really the spirit of misrule in
the kingdom of Western thought. Whether it be Freud's id, Marx's proletariat,
or Levi-Strauss's Third World culture, the discovery of the Jewish theorist is
the survival of that part of the human spirit which has resisted genteel acculturation. Thus, for each of these architects of modernism, the pain of passage
from traditional society to modern, from the Gemeinschaft of the shtetl to the
Gesellschaft of liberal society, lies not in its acknowledged costs-impersonality, loneliness, and the like-but in its supposed benefit-the dignity it confers
upon the individual.8 0 The burden of this dignity is the ordeal of civility; the
resentful response expressed in each of these spectacularly successful crashes
of the lawn party of Western civilization is to violate decorum by exposing81 the
soiled undergarments of civilization-its sexuality, materiality, savagery.
In that regard, one of Cuddihy's more bizarre chapters, "A Tale of Two
Hoffmans: The Decorum Decision and the Bill of Rites," 82 treats the defendants in the legendary Chicago Seven trial, especially Abbie Hoffman, as pursuing an analogous strategy of calculated embarrassment. In what amounts to a
dramatization of Marx's essay on the Jewish question, Abbie Hoffman, by
targeting Judge Julius Hoffman, placed Judaism on both sides of the civilization divide. Hairy, unkempt, accented, irrepressible, wise-cracking, shrugging,
Yiddish-talking Abbie Hoffman broadly played the shtetl-dweller, just off the
boat. Conspiratorially addressing Judge Hoffman as "Julie," he implicated the
judge in the conspiracy for which he was being tried. 83 By calling public attention to Judge Hoffman's Jewishness, defendant Hoffman conveyed a multiple
message.
First, the decorum of the courtroom, requiring each participant to portray
himself as a universal citizen, was inauthentic, and thereby an illicit condition
of his rights. Second, Judge Hoffman's effort to wear an Anglo-Saxon mask
had failed. 84 Third, his effort to mask himself was itself a humiliating confession of inadequacy and marginality rather than a display of dignity and importance. Judge Hoffman's devotion to decorum, and indeed to law, was just the
craven assimilation of a self-hating Jew. Fourth, not only Judge Hoffman's
efforts to police Defendant Hoffman's courtroom behavior, but the entire prosecution, was an effort to suppress the authenticity of the shtetl Jew and to mark
his disruptive presence as un-American. Fifth, Judge Hoffman was not simply
striving to "pass," but was actually collaborating in the persecution of his own
people. In sum, Defendant Hoffman "argued" to Judge Hoffman, that in stifling him, the judge was attempting to stifle his own authentic self. Meanwhile,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See hi. at 3-14.
See id at 10-13.
See id at 3-14.
Id at 189-202.
Id. at 194.
See id
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the prosecution in what he believed to be his own courtroom was in fact the
judge's own persecution.
For Cuddihy, the defendants turned their trial on conspiracy and riot
charges into a wider debate on a general point of law: whether genteel decorum and bourgeois civility were constitutional conditions for the enjoyment of
Anglo-Saxon civil liberties.8 5 The Supreme Court had eliminated racial and
wealth requirements for the enjoyment of civil rights, but was there a manners
requirement as well? 86 Is a trial really a ceremony in which citizens win their
civil liberties at the price of a ritual of obeisance and fealty? Cuddihy suggests
that the provocative, jesting actions of the Chicago Seven and of similar defendants in other 1960s era trials "aimed at demonstrating that every civil right
has, as hidden proviso, a bourgeois rite, and that all civil rights are alienable
with the nonperformance of civic rites."'8 7 The defendants had rightly perceived that the true social subtext of the trial was the affirmation of a certain
type of political subject-the properly civil citizen who was the rightful owner
of civil rights. Their "defense" therefore, took the logically subversive form of
refusing to adopt that social role, thus exposing the artificiality and superficiality of the state's and the court's notion of constitutional principle.
Later, at the trial of Bobby Seale and other Black Panthers, the judge demanded from the defendants an apology for misbehavior and a promise of good
behavior as a condition of their remaining in the courtroom. 88 Codefendant
David Hilliard later bragged "he had been crafty enough to outwit the system"
by making the vow insincerely. 89 Cuddihy insists that the system had in fact
outwitted the defendants, since it exacted from them precisely what it wantednot true love and obedience, but mere ceremonial fealty. 90 Hilliard mistakenly
thought he had completed the act of deconstruction by co-opting the court's
hypocrisy. Cuddihy believes that, in fact, this was not hypocrisy in any disturbing sense at all-it was honest aesthetic artifice. 91 The court happily accepted the proper "ceremonies of innocence" as the moral equivalent of civil
identity. The court had subtly out-negotiated the subversives; the cooptation
had been reversed.
B.

Representing Nazism

Perhaps the paradigm of the legal proceeding in which the symbolic and
expressive elements predominate over instrumental concerns is the war crimes
trial.92 Thus, the highly publicized trial in France of Nazi war criminal Klaus
Barbie was presented to the public, by press and prosecution alike, as an edifying performance, an object of interpretation. Because the outcome was a fore85. See id. at 196-97.
86. See id. at 197.
87. Id. at 199.
88. See id. at 197.
89. Id. at 201.
90. See id.
91. See id.
at 201
92. This discussion is drawn from Guyora Binder, RepresentingNazism: Advocacy and Identity at
the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989).
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gone conclusion, the strategic courtroom advocacy we usually read as
instrumental, here organized itself into a contest over the cultural meaning of
condemning an indefensible defendant whose trial seemed a scripted, sacrificial
ritual.
Barbie's trial was an occasion for building group identity. Representatives
victim groups, authorized by French criminal procedure to particivarious
of
pate in the prosecution, vied for martyr status. 9 3 Particularly charged was a
debate between Jewish survivors and Resistance veterans over whether to interpret Nazism primarily as anti-Semitic genocide or as illiberal political repression. 94 Perhaps even more controversial were the efforts of Barbie's defense
attorney, Jacques Verges, to implicate the accusers in Barbie's crimes, portraying the Nazi occupation of France as a mere instance of imperialism. Hence, it
was no more genocidal or repressive than France's colonization of Algeria, or
Israel's occupation of the West Bank. 95 In this way, the Barbie trial, like the
Chicago Seven trial, combined a reprise of the Jewish question with the New
Left's theatrics of disruption. In exploiting the trial's opportunity to define
themselves by opposition to Nazism, the victim groups ironically placed their
identities en prise, hostage to Barbie's own account of the motives of his
96
crimes.
How did Barbie's trial come to be staged as an edifying debate on the
meaning of Nazism, and on the relative cultural identities of the French, the
French left, and the Jews?
First, a global audience for such a performance was assembled by the news
media, which portrayed Barbie as an emblematic Nazi who had deported Jewish children to death camps, murdered the left-wing Resistance leader Jean
Moulin, and later served the repressive Bolivian regime that killed the chic
revolutionary Che Guevara. Once captured, Barbie obligingly presented himself as an unrepentant Nazi, proclaiming continued devotion to his Nazi "ideals." Yet he invited interpretation97 of his actions by refusing to explain these
ideals or even to appear in court.
Second, in formulating Barbie's charges, the French judiciary invited competing representations of Nazism by making ideological motive an element of
the charged offense. In order to circumvent French statutes of limitation and
prohibitions on retroactive prosecution, the courts rooted "imprescriptible" liability for "crimes against humanity" in customary international law. 98 This reliance on international custom, however, provoked the defense argument that
occupying powers have customarily committed atrocities. The courts attempted to distinguish Nazi from French colonial atrocities, opening a debate
on the distinctive heinousness of Nazi atrocities. Careful to retain among the
charged offenses not only Barbie's participation in genocide, but his repression
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

1339-55.
1324-38.
1355-62.
1339-55, 1381-83.
1324-28.

98. Ma at 1328-29.
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of the Resistance, the courts limited crimes against humanity to atrocities committed in the service of a "state practicing a policy of ideological hegemony."
Accordingly, the prosecution was obliged to prove that Barbie's offenses were
motivated by "the national socialist ideology." 99

Because French procedure permits victims of a criminal offense representation at trial, victims competed for the role of Nazism's chief opponent, exemplifying the use of legal dispute as a setting for the aesthetic creation of
identity. Yet the prosecution of Nazi ideology ascribes more coherence and
integrity-more "identity"-to Nazi thoughts and practices than is probably
warranted. The convergence of so many contending groups on the stratagem of
defining themselves by contrast to Nazism reveals a contemporary crisis of
cultural identity that transcends any particular group. The less confidence we
feel in the coherence of our own purposes and principles, the greater the temptation to identify ourselves in contrast to a malignant ideology. Ironically, Nazism provided an identity for Germans only by ascribing "a similarly malignant
coherence of purpose to Jews."1 00 In representing ourselves as victims, we
ascribe to the oppressor an enviable commitment and conviction that increasingly seems beyond the capacity of any morally sensitive person.101
This contemporary crisis of cultural identity was especially visible in two
particular identity crises "in evidence" at the Barbie trial, those of post-Holocaust Judaism and post-Occupation France.
The Holocaust destroyed the covental basis of Jewish theology in a divine
promise of preservation and prosperity in return for fidelity. While orthodoxy
had traditionally interpreted persecution and suffering as divine retribution for
infidelity that could be redeemed by greater religious commitment, the devastation of the Holocaust seemed disproportionate even to the sin of modem secularism, and misdirected at the most traditional and faithful communities of
Jews. The leading response to this covental crisis, enunciated at the trial by star
prosecution witness Elie Wiesel, substitutes the memory of the Holocaust for
fidelity to God as the fundamental commitment of Judaism, and substitutes the
victims for God as the postwar Jew's covental partner.10 2 Yet this effort to
derive a new Jewish identity from the martyrdom of traditional Jewry may be
self-defeating insofar as it assimilates Judaism to Christianity.10 3
As the Holocaust for Judaism, so was the Occupation for France: the irreparable wound. The conflict it provoked between collaboration and resistance
remained an internal war in which the battle lines could never be cleanly
drawn. Yet the Occupation was also an integrative moment, fusing existentialist philosophy with Marxist politics to produce a Left. Like postwar Jews, prewar existentialists were disillusioned theists in search of a civil religion. The
Resistance to fascism, however, provided the secular quest that could structure
a moral universe. An impotent fringe before the war, the intellectual left found
99. Id.
at 1337-39.
100. Id.at 1344.

101. See id. at 1344-45.
102. See id. at 1345.
103. See id.
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itself at war's end as the embodiment of a myth of universal resistance. 10 4 The
difficulty was that this myth flew in the face of tacit knowledge that quiet collaboration had been ubiquitous. The price of the intellectual left's political
power and cultural influence was collaboration in the lie that the Resistance had
led a united France. The realization that they were now implicated in the very
hypocrisy they opposed drove leftist intellectuals into a self-consuming critique
which eventually repudiated the ideals of authenticity and moral autonomy
which had originally inspired them. The structuralist pronouncements of the
death of "Man" and "the Subject" were at once indictments of existentialism
and extensions of its phobic obsessions with heteronomy and hypocrisy.
Deconstructive critiques of languages and cultures as inherently
incoherent re10 5
flected a further surrender to the inevitability of occupation.
This context helps explain one of the great puzzles of the Barbie trial: how
could Verges, himself a Resistance veteran, visible in radical circles since the
1950s, defend a Nazi, the murderer of Jean Moulin and opponent of Che
Guevara? Part of the explanation lies in his shift away from a humanist conception of political advocacy as an effort to give voice to the authentic subjectivity of a dissident client. Verges first achieved notoriety as a defender of
Algerian revolutionaries and later defended Palestinians accused of terrorism.
Both of these roles expressed a sympathy with the self-determination claims of
dispossessed populations once fashionable with the French left. But with the
emergence of the poststructuralist critiques of identity and authenticity, the
ideal of self-determination seemed incoherent. A critique of colonialism could
no longer be premised on the dignity of the colonized but had to focus on the
hypocrisy of the colonist.
Verges could defend a Nazi because he no longer accepted the responsibility, or even the possibility, of identifying with the personality and politics of his
client. His was an effort not to defend a client, but to hijack the prosecution.
The trial, Verges contended, "is a kind of ritual. They mean, by spilling his
blood, to do like they do when killing a goat, to exorcize some evil."10 6 If the
function of a scapegoat is to unify society by symbolically exorcizing violence,
Verges sought to "rupture" French society by forcing it to reintegrate Barbie.10 7
Verges made deliberately ironic use of his role as defense attorney to accuse France of complicity in his clients' crime.10 8 Where a conventional lawyer might have sought to deflect attention from evidence inculpating his client,
Verges offered several strained procedural arguments that served only to harp
on evidence of Barbie's genocidal crimes that French authorities had long possessed and ignored. Another stratagem involved threatening to expose what he
claimed was widespread collaboration with Barbie in the upper echelons of the
Resistance. By threatening to undermine the trial's propaganda function,
Verges hoped to enhance the prospect that his-technical objections to Barbie's
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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prosecution would get a serious hearing. Moreover, by threatening scandalous
revelations, Verges drummed up an audience for his own propaganda message
equating Nazism with colonialism.
Although represented by different parties at the Barbie trial, the identity
crises of Judaism and of the French left are outgrowths of a common culture of
despair that paralyzes moral choice in the wake of Nazi atrocities. Feeling their
way in the darkness around the abyss of moral luck implied by the Holocaust,
both traditions are reduced to immobility. Unfolding with bureaucratic inevitability, the Holocaust depended upon the action and inaction of millions of ordinary people. As a consequence, postwar society is permeated by an anxiety
that any of its members might have participated, collaborated, or acquiesced
under similar circumstances. Believing that all creeds define themselves by
their antipathies, members of postwar society eschew commitment to any cause
for fear of becoming complicit in future atrocities. And so, they conclude, the
only relief from this moral paralysis rests in the recollection of Nazi crimes,
because they constitute the only evil one can despise without fear of becoming
a Nazi oneself. This was the cultural setting of the Barbie trial, a culture devoted to the contemplation of Nazi atrocity as an obscure but sacred text, a
culture distinct from and yet enabling of all the cultural identities performed by
its participants.
C. Policing Religious and Sexual Identity
The legal scholar and literary historian Janet Halley has explored the complex interaction between the legal regulation of conduct and the legal regulation
of identity in two widely disparate contexts: the policing of religion in Renaissance England, 10 9 and the policing of sexual orientation in contemporary
America.' 1 0 These examples primarily involve criminal law, but as various
parties adapt to the terrain defined by criminal law, other "legal" arenas may be
affected, including religious law, civil rights law, legislative advocacy, popular
protest, individual self-presentation, and even self-perception.
In Equivocation and the Legal Conflict Over Religious Identity in Early
Modem England,"' Halley examines how the strategy of equivocation developed by English Jesuits facing religious persecution reshaped the landscape of
available religious identities for all concerned. All the while, both institutional
parties to the dispute, the English state and the Jesuit order, insisted on the
112
stability of religious identity.
Jesuits taught that Catholics could at once hide and inwardly reaffirm their
religious faith without violating Catholic ethics. Jesuit priests were instructed
to exploit the ambiguities of vocabulary and syntax so that they could be tech109. See Janet E. Halley, Equivocation and the Legal Conflict Over Religious Identity in Early
Modern England, 3 YALE J.L. & HumAiN. 33 (1991).
110. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v.

Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993).
111. See Halley, supra note 109.
112. See id. at 38.
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nically truthful to the English courts, while still avoiding answers that would
condemn them.
First, [a Jesuit] could use words having more than one common meaning-for
example, declaring that a priest "lyeth not in my house," and meaning that he
does not tell lies there. Second, he could give only one of several possible
answers to a question-for instance, declaring that he came to a friend's house
to have dinner and omitting to mention a purpose to celebrate mass as well.
Third, he might exploit the ambiguities of hidden gestures, unclear pronoun
reference, altered pronunciation-any
addition to standard usage that would
113
create an ambiguity.
But the strategy of "mental reservation," of silently qualifying an answer, was
the most threatening to English authorities:
For the Jesuits endorsed a form of response which gave the interpreter no indication of its possible ambiguities: a Catholic in England was allowed by this
doctrine to make an audible statement that would mislead the hearer, and to
add to it, silently, a modification (or mental reservation)that rendered the entire sentence true. For instance: "I did1 14not see Father Gerard [ut tibi dicam]
[i.e., in order to tell you about him]."
As Halley notes, the strategy of mental reservation enabled Jesuits to maintain
a secret but authentic Catholic identity, and it threatened the state precisely
because it undermined the official policy of policing identity on the basis of
religious affiliation.1 15 Civil order, notes Halley, was equated with transparent
expression; 16 accurate detection of identities was an important method of state
policing. 11 7 Catholics subverted the state by constructing private selves that
could pass undetected. 118 To do so, they had to reject the state's assumption
that language was transparently referential and inherently confessional. They
treated language instead as "multivalent, unstable, and conventional," always in
dialogue with an inner voice.1 1 9
The struggle between equivocation and referential clarity manifested itself
in ordeals of civility. Thus, in the trials of Guy Fawkes and the other "Gunpowder" plotters, Attorney General Coke characterized the legal struggle as
one over discourse: he accused the Catholics of subverting the language with
dissimulation.1 20 The result was a trial over "tissues" of words,1 21 where
Fawkes insisted on his right to control the narrative of events, and Coke conceded his reciprocal entanglement
by insisting that his version of the rebellion
"will appearto be fact."122
113. Id. at 34-35.
114. Id. at 35 (quoting A TREATISE OF EQUIVOCATION 48-52 (David Jardine ed., 1851)).
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In another trial, Anglican Dean Morton insisted that speech was always
public, governed by law, and referential, 12 3 while the Jesuit Parsons argued that
internal speech was legally permissible and psychologically possible. 124 For
Parsons, just as writing represents speech, speech represents inner mental pro125
positions, and so a mental statement has the same status as a spoken one.
Speech could be spoken without social intercourse and still be speech. Particularly when faced with illegitimate state authority, the speaker could retreat from
society and speak only to himself. 126 Under such a view, however, privacy is
not an impregnable shell, but "a social and legal relationship between the Catholic and his inquisitor."1 27 Thus, a priest challenged to admit that his name was
Peter could answer "no" (mentally reserving the full answer that he "was not
Peter who was bound to reply to this judge"), because he viewed the judge as
illegitimate.1 28 Whether or not the priest is Peter, then, turns on his relationship to the legal authority with whom he speaks.1 29
By contrast, Morton held that "personal privacy is inviolable."1 30 Underlying the inviolate self is a "constant conscience against which [the representational accuracy] of speech and writing can be tested." 13 1 The mind cannot
honestly equivocate, because it cannot honestly misrepresent.1 32 A man knows
his own mind before he proceeds to speak. He does not need speech to under13 3
stand his own thoughts.
Morton suggests true speech is always public and relational, governed by
law and custom, and all representation is subject to state control. 134 The state
has the power to interpret the meaning of the represented thought; the listener
has the power to fix the speaker's identity. 135 As Halley notes, this is, in effect,
a battle over jurisdiction. 136 The state allows a private self, but controls all
outward manifestations of selfhood. 13 7 This is how the negotiation between
competing notions of selfhood and conscience gets resolved. Thus, when an
Irish grand jury refused to indict a Catholic who had obviously violated
Anglican rules, the jurors were charged with perjury. The jurors equivocated in
defense by saying that when they took the juror's oath, they did so with the
reservation that they would not act against conscience, and further claimed that
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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the deception was in the mind of the listener-the state. 138 The court twisted
139
the dialectic: since it was deceived, the speakers had lied.
The mental reservation's genius enabled one at once to avoid the sin of
dissembling by silently confessing one's Catholicism, yet manage to dissemble
by enacting the Catholic identity that one denied. Dissembling came to constitute the very Catholic identity it disguised because it traduced the Anglican
effort to obliterate Catholicism. The result was Catholic religious identity reconstructed in Protestant terms, as a private and internal matter.1 40 Yet the
Jesuits would not go so far as to encourage or excuse participation in Anglican
ritual, which they regarded as apostasy. 14 1 In this way they collaborated with

their Anglican opponents in polarizing the field of religious identity.
Halley resists a deconstructionist treatment of this struggle as a clash between a repressive essentialism and the free play of textuality. 142 Such a glib
reading leaves out the key element-a negotiation and reciprocity between the
two sides over the common problem posed by the "church papists," who publicly partook in Anglican worship while silently considering themselves
Catholics 143 and performing Catholic services at home. 144 Their actions were
neither subversive nor civilly disobedient.1 45 They attended Anglican church
not out of begrudging compliance with the penal law, but because they honestly
valued that church attendance. 146 In doing so, church papists subverted both
the Jesuit insistence on the formal manifestations that identified a Catholic and
the Anglican insistence on a strict Anglican communion. 1 47 In this way the
church papists resisted the efforts of both Catholics and Anglicans to define the
constitutive elements of religious identity, 148 and they rejected the Manichaean
dilemma imposed upon them by both sides. In their struggle to capture and
identify this elusive group of church papists, Anglicans and Jesuits shared a
common insistence upon orthodoxy, even as they continuously revised the constituents of orthodoxy in response to one another's stratagems.
Much of Halley's other legal scholarship explores the similar fluidity of
sexual orthodoxy and heresy in contemporary society. Her work on sexual orientation demonstrates how the regulation of sexual conduct and of sexual identity conditions, without completely determining, the identities that people
develop; and how the strategic choices actors make reshape the law's categories and alms. According to Halley:
debates about sexual orientation require all the players to participate in the
construction of their own sexual orientation identities, and to make themselves
138. See id. at 48.

139. See id. at 48-49.
140. See id. at 51.
141. See id. at 45.
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available for interpretation along this register by others. In debating about sexual orientation, we do not just reflect or deliberate upon it and how it shall be
used to effect redistribution of social goods: we also constitute it and enroll
ourselves in it.... The role of law in constituting persons by providing a forum
for their conflicts over who they shall be understood to be is deeply material,
even though it involves not physical force but the more subtle dynamics of
representation. 149
In The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Identity,150 Halley provides a complex taxonomy of sexual identity in which persecution, secrecy, and publicity once again shape identity. The
point of the piece is that homophobia discourages public advocacy of the interests of homosexuals. 1 5 1 Halley urges heightened equal protection scrutiny of
antihomosexual discrimination in the interest of correcting the political underrepresentation of homosexuals. 152 In the course of developing her argument,
Halley criticizes the view that sexual preference is immutable and the theory
that suspect classification analysis must be contingent on the immutability of
153
one's membership in a class.
Rather, Halley emphasizes the coercive influence on the formation of identity resulting from legal sanctions against homosexuality and legally backed
social sanctions such as employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.15 4 According to Halley, these sanctions have three significant effects.
First, they reduce the number of people who identify as homosexual, by pressuring people not to manifest homoerotic feelings and by discouraging those
who might otherwise choose to live as gay or lesbian for political or affectional
reasons.' 5 5 Second, they reduce the number of people who publicly support or
ally with the political interests of gays and lesbians, by threatening these potential supporters with the burdens suffered by those to whom homosexuality is
publicly ascribed, whether or not such people consider themselves homosexual. 15 6 Third, by intimidating most people into acquiescing in the default
ascription of heterosexual identity, discriminatory sanctions turn the vast and
potentially fluid margin between gay and straight into a vacant free fire-zone, a
proverbial no-man's land. 157 Together, these three effects diminish the number
of self-identifying homosexuals, and make them more politically insular and
discretely differentiated from the rest of the population than they need be.
Hence, self-identifying homosexuals are inadequately represented by ordinary
interest group politics and need the legal protection suspect classification status
confers.
149. Halley, supra note 110, at 1729.
150. Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet. Towards Equal Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rav. 915 (1989).
151. See id. at 970-73.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 923-63.
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Halley acknowledges, but does not fully confront, one major difficulty.
Given the inevitable shaping effect of law on social identity that Halley so well
demonstrates, how can law's equally inevitable influence on political discourse
be critiqued as undesirably coercive? Halley's social constructivist conception
of identity seems to dictate that any argument for protecting the range of politico-sexual identities that antisodomy laws help suppress requires a substantive
defense of the value of those identities.
Halley's Reasoning About Sodomy' 5 8 offers a close reading of the Bowers
v. Hardwick159 opinions in light of the earlier development of the litigation.
Halley highlights the struggle of the litigants and judges over the relationship
between homosexual identity and the crime of "sodomy," generally defined in
sexual-orientation-neutral terms.1 60 The Supreme Court's narrowing of the issue to the constitutionality, under the due process clause, of punishing "homosexual sodomy" has been one of the most criticized aspects of the case. 16 1
Halley argues that the imperfect fit between the conduct proscribed by antisodomy statutes and homosexual identity paradoxically magnifies the effectiveness of antisodomy statutes in superordinating heterosexual identity. By
threatening everyone with prosecution, regardless of his or her sexual orientation, antisodomy laws position heterosexual identity as a valuable but conditional privilege to avoid prosecution for technically criminal behavior. The
conjunction of overbroad legal proscriptions and the contingency of enforcement on cultural identity creates a powerful symbiotic tension. The potential
vulnerability of heterosexuals to prosecution enhances the cultural authority of
heterosexuality even as it disempowers all those individuals who must vie for
uncertain protection of heterosexual status. Halley makes the even more surprising claim that the ambiguity of antisodomy prohibitions between the regulation of conduct and the regulation of identity enhances the cultural authority
and stability of these prohibitions.1 62 She identifies and resists the temptation
to make the "naive deconstructive claim" that the "figural" instability of the
Hardwick decision, or the more generally prevalent rhetoric on which it relies,
"undermines... its claims to authority."' 16 3 The indeterminate object of sexual
regulation paradoxically legitimates it and magnifies its effect.
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160.
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Halley, supra note 110.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
See Halley, supra note 110, at 1741-70.
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rights).
162. See Halley, supra note 110, at 1770-72.
163. Id. at 1747-48.
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D. Litigating Tribal Identity
In The Predicamentof Culture,164 the intellectual historian James Clifford
offers a "literary" rendering of a civil property trial over lands once owned by
the Mashpee Indian tribe. In Clifford's analysis, the forms of legal procedure
and the categories of legal entitlements can be read as an exercise in identifying
how legal doctrine, ritual, strategic choice, and imagination interact to create
group identity, tradition, and history. In an appreciative essay, Gerald Torres
and Kathryn Milun develop Clifford's analysis into a normative argument for
institutionalizing cultural diversity as a means of enriching what we might call
165
the media of self-expression.
In this case, tribal affiliation is the identity in controversy. 166 The difficulty
in defining the characteristics of a tribe in Indian law implicates the wider problem of group identity-the relationship between tribe, nation, ethnic group, and
culture. As the Indian witnesses in the Mashpee trial are questioned about their
identification with the purported tribal group, we see how their effort to identify
themselves requires them to negotiate a topography of identity not entirely
within their control. 167 At the same time, the effort to claim and conserve what
the larger society will respect as "tradition" requires its invention and adaptation. The tribe's interests do not derive so much from tradition but from a
shared project of constructing what society will recognize as a tradition.
The ultimate issue in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.168 was whether
land had been unlawfully conveyed from the Mashpee Tribe to non-Indians in
the nineteenth century. 169 Specifically, the alienation of land had not taken
place by treaty, which is the sole means permitted by the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1790.170 The decisive question, however, was the preliminary
one of legal standing: whether an entity existed called the Mashpee Tribe that
could be a party to a lawsuit. 17 1 Of course, to own land or enjoy rights to land,
one must be a person, natural or legal. The Mashpee trial raised the historically
embedded question of how a group whose members' economic, religious, and
political lives partially overlap can identify a common denominator that is sufficiently coherent and compelling to win recognition as a legal person. For the
Indians and for their expert witnesses in anthropology, the overlap is best captured as a shifting coalition of relations, changing over time, and varying in
164. J. CLiFFORD, THE PREDICAMmIT OF CuLtruRE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LrTERA-

TuOPE AND ART 277-346 (1988).
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166. See CLuORD, supra note 164, at 277, 288-99.
167. See, e.g., id. at 281, 286-86, 291-93, 310-12 (giving testimonies of various witnesses).
168. 427 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1978).
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and coherence that
emphasis. The law, however, imposes criteria of continuity172
seem Procrustean in the face of anthropology and history.
The disjunction between legal identity and ethnographic identity provoked
this exasperated plaint from the trial judge:
I am seriously considering striking all of the definitions given by all of the
experts of a Tribe and all of their opinions as to whether or not the inhabitants
of Mashpee at any time could constitute a Tribe. I let it all in on the theory that
there was a professionally accepted definition of Tribe within these various
disciplines.
It is becoming more and more apparent that each definition is highly subjective and idiosyncratic and generated for a particular purpose not necessarily
having anything to do with the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790.173
The judge ultimately instructed the jury to determine whether the Mashpee
were a tribe by the legal criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in a 1901
case also having nothing to do with the Non-Intercourse Act: "By a 'tribe' we
understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though
sometimes ill-defined territory." 174 Thus, as Torres and Milun note, the judge

assimilated indigenous peoples into a sort of late Victorian model of the sovereign nation-state which requires racial purity, political hierarchy, and (relative)
territorial stability. 175 Crucially, the judge also instructed the jury that if, at any
point in the last two centuries, the Mashpee did not meet these criteria, they
176
could never subsequently recover tribal status.
The trial was essentially a conflict between two narratives of Indian history. 177 The opposing sides held different images of tribal status, or, more generally, disparate notions of culture and social identity. The jury did not have
the option of devising an equitable compromise between these visions but
could only endorse one or the other. In this sense, the law follows the logic of
literacy, of the historical archive, rather than the logic of changing collective
memory; the shifting oral history of Mashpee had to be set in documentary
stone.
The plaintiffs' experts were anthropologists relying on field work to define
the concept of "tribe," while the defendants relied more on the historians' tool
of written documentation. 178 One anthropologist witness proffered five criteria
for the definition of a tribe: a group of Indians, members by birth or ascription,
'a kinship network,' a clear consciousness of kind-'we' versus 'they,' a territory or homeland, and political leadership." 179 He described how powwows,
172. See id. at 277-80.
173. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1978) (quoted in Torres
& Milun, supra note 165, at 634).
174. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) (quoted in Torres & Milun, supra note
165, at 633 (quoting Record in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp. 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1978))).
175. Tores & Milun, supra note 165, at 634.
176. See CL-'i'oRD, supra note 164, at 333-34.

177. See id. at 317, 339-41.
178. See id. at 317-18.
179. Id. at 319.
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although sometimes catering to outsiders and tourists, also serve social, spiritual, and educational functions which are sacred and private. Another witness
rejected any such sharp doctrinal definition of tribe, portraying instead a field
of family resemblances and local histories as reference points.' 8 0 When the
flexibility of this witness's definition was denounced for its vagueness, the witness responded that the more formalistic definitions presume distinctions
among categories-religious, political, etc.-which are antipathetic to Indian
thinking.' 8 l Thus, the "Indian" definition of a tribe is a perfect example of
Greenblattian negotiation. As the witness put it: "What you are talking about
is a group of people who know where they are. They may have to respond to
outside pressures and adopt political structures, religious structures, or eco18 2
nomic structures to deal with outside society.'
Conversely, the defendants relied on written history to develop categorical
definitions of what constituted a tribe. The defense purported to show that the
so-called Mashpee "tribe" was not a distinct tribe at all, but in fact a loose
composite of refugees from several other tribes and ethnic groups. 183 Indeed, it
was noted, English pilgrims had helped create the artificial society called
Mashpee out of charity, establishing a "South Sea Indian Plantation" as a refuge for Indians from a variety of tribes who had converted to Christianity. 184
The Christian conversion itself, of course, undercut any claim of cultural continuity for the tribe, as Christian ritual replaced traditional powwows and other
"pagan" rites.185 In the defendants' view, then, any Mashpee claim to land had
to rest on a "written deed and on English law rather than on any aboriginal
86
sovereignty."'
The defense supported their claim that the Mashpee had moved from sovereignty to legal and cultural assimilation by referencing several historical events.
First, after an appeal to King George ImI and a series of legislative acts, the
Mashpee won the right to become an incorporated town in 1870.187 As the
area became commercial between 1870 and 1920, tribal governance almost
completely disappeared, because Indians were too busy becoming "individual
citizen-farmers, workers, and businessmen."' 8 8 Moreover, the Indian inhabitants of Mashpee not only fought with the colonists against the British in the
Revolutionary War, they sided with whites in wars against other Indians. 189
Furthermore, the defendants argued, the Mashpee Indians intermarried widely
with other Indians and with blacks, and thus sacrificed cultural integrity in the
name of expansion or assimilation. 190 Finally, in the defendants' view, few
180. See id. at 322-23.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See id. at 324.
Id. at 323.
See id. at 294.
Id. at 294-95.
See id. at 295.

186. Id. at 295-96.
187. See id. at 296.
188. Id. at 300.

189. See id. at 296-97.
190. See id.

May 1997]

CULTURAL CRITICISM

1183

current residents who claimed Indian heritage knew much about Indian ritual
and tradition, and, to learn about them, those few actually had to travel to Western reservations or to take Native American Studies classes in college. 19 1
The plaintiffs told a very different story: acknowledging that many of the
members of the putative Mashpee tribe were refugees from other groups, they
argued that what had created refugee status was "precisely" the devastation
wrought on tribal integrity by contact with whites. 192 But rather than merely
insisting that the Mashpees constituted a tribe according to conventional notions, the plaintiffs argued even more forcefully that the conception of a tribe as
a stable sovereign nation is a Western concept required by the rigid categories
of Western lawmaking. 193 The Mashpee Indians could be viewed as sharing a
coherent culture so long as the criteria of coherence could remain fluid.
On the religion issue, the plaintiffs insisted that although many Indians had
become Baptists, their conversion was consistent with the general pattern of
fluid identity, and specifically incorporated Indian traditions and beliefs. 194 In
addition, Indian preachers retained a powerful role within the Indian Christian
church, often conducting bilingual services, and turning their churches into an
arm of Indian culture that resisted outside influence.195 The plaintiffs argued
that the Mashpee decision to fight with the colonists against other Indians was
partly a matter of sheer survival and partly the perfectly conventional act of one
tribe fighting another. 196 The plaintiffs also argued that intermarriage in no
way defeats tribal identity so long as the shifting nature of group identity is
recognized. 197 As Clifford notes:
Mashpee was a refuge for misfits, refugees, and marginal groups. At certain
times a natural alliance against dominant white society formed between the
town's Indian "survivors" and newly freed blacks. The crucial issue is whether
the core Indian community absorbed the outsiders or were themselves absorbed
in the Indian melting pot. 198
The plaintiffs argued that they resisted Western schemes of land tenure and
town governance for as long as they could. 199 The South Sea Indian leaders
recognized that some formal structure for land titles such as town status was
necessary to save their lands from white aggression.2 0o In 1834, they adopted
"modified plantation status," roughly akin to reservation status, as a way of
keeping collective control over land and immigration while maintaining contact
with white society. 20 Moreover, "[c]ontinuing entailments on land sales
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id. at 309, 313-14, 316.
Idat302-07.
See id.
See id.
at 303-05.
See id.
at 304-05.
See id. at 306.
See id.
Id.
See id.
at 303-05.
See id.
at 305.
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at 308.
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outside the community guaranteed a flexible nineteenth-century tribalism. '20 2
In addition, land allotments accorded with traditional Indian patterns of land
use. 20 3 What to the white man may have been indicia of political immaturity
may have been to the Mashpee a rejection of formal township status in the
name of Indian citizenship; it may have been prudent, however, to explain their
position to the Massachusetts legislature in terms of progress toward conventional citizenship and proprietorship. The Mashpee claimed that only a small
and unusually assimilated minority of the tribe's members had voted for disentailment, and they were essentially coerced into doing so as the condition of
their political enfranchisement. 2 °4
Furthermore, the plaintiffs attributed the demise of tribal self-rule in the late
nineteenth century to the coercive policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 20 5
Moreover, they questioned the assumption that tribal decisionmaking had disappeared, noting that this assumption was based on the Western custom of embodying political decisions in written records, as opposed to the Indian oral
tradition. 20 6 Finally, the plaintiffs noted that the Mashpee remained a powerful
and coherent influence in local politics through church and town government. 20 7 While many tribes sought recognition from a newly sympathetic Bureau of Indian Affairs in the 1930s, for example, the Mashpee did not have to,
20 8
since an Indian majority controlled the town government.
For the plaintiffs, the Mashpee's story was one of coercion, adaptation, and
survival. For the defendants, it was a perversely congratulatory story of successful assimilation into American pluralism. In fact, the history of the
Mashpee is one of stops and starts-assertions of political independence, attempts to establish tribal identity within the new structure, assimilation of other
marginal groups into that structure, choices between state or federal protection
and political independence, and negotiation through the maze of both coercion
and enticement by white society. As Clifford puts it, "[tiheir history was a
series of cultural and political transactions, not all-or-nothing conversions or
resistances. Indians in Mashpee lived and acted between cultures in a series of
'209
ad hoc engagements.
Several of the plaintiffs' witnesses were people who moved casually, and
sometimes invisibly, between Indian and non-Indian life. They might live in
Mashpee and work in Boston;2 10 they might be involved in tribal affairs, but
then spin off separately to administer business considered to be inconsistent
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
tables").
207.

Id.
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 298-300, 305, 307-08.
id. at 309.
id. at 309-10 (stating that "traditional myths and stories were told around kitchen

See id.

208. See id. at 300-01, 308-09.
209. Id. at 342.
210. See id. at 311 (Russell Peters' testimony revealed that although living in Mashpee, he worked
in Boston).
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with Indian culture.21 1 Did that prove or disprove the coherence of the Indian
identity?
Witnesses were questioned as to how often they participated in native
dances 212 or wore regalia. 2 13 Teachers of Indian culture were asked why their
students needed any education in being Indian if they were inherently Indian.2 14 The witnesses' and anthropologists' response, of course, was that the
defendants were imposing a Procrustean notion of tribal identity. 21 5 A defense
witness said that though he called himself a Wampanoag Indian, he was referring to his Indian ancestry and not to any tribal affiliation. 2 16 Indeed, he acknowledged, without any concession on the legal issue, that he could not define
"tribe. '217 The fetish over tribal purity was, psychologically, the problem of
the Caucasian defendants. Unfortunately it became, the plaintiff's legal
problem.
Clifford argues that the Mashpee have survived as a coherent people precisely because they have not conformed to white categories. 2 18 Continuity is
required by hybrid identity, but continuity is at war with coherence. 2 19 Indeed,
Clifford argues, the jury instructions, requiring that both continuity and coherence of tribal status be established as independent elements, were essentially
self-contradictory. 220 Indian politics was informal, not hierarchical; in order to
file a suit in 1976, the Mashpee formed the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. to serve as the tribe's legal arm. 2 21 In effect, the tribe paid obeisance to
legal form by creating a legal identity for the purpose of asserting its natural
22 2
and continuous identity; it followed civil rites to assert bourgeois rights.
Torres and Milun point out the paradox: "'The law does not permit the
Mashpee's story to be particularized and still be legally intelligible." 2 23 Yet
Clifford suggests that the need to assert identity for the purpose of the lawsuit
had a continuing "feedback" effect on the tribe, since it probably revived the
movement for tribal independence. 224 The lawsuit is part of the story of the
tribe's adaptation, not simply an alien imposition. 225 Moreover, Clifford argues, in helping to shape the Mashpee's current identity, the lawsuit altered not
211. See id. at 293. In his testimony, John Peters was asked about the several businesses in which

he had been involved. Peters "conunent[ed] that the art of making money is probably inconsistent with
being an Indian" but said that all Mashpee Indians do it. See also id. at 311 (quoting the testimony of
Russell Peters, who indicated that "no self-respecting tribe would become incorporated").
212. See id. at 301.
213. See, e.g., id. at 283.

214. See id. at 313-15.
215. See id. at 317-25.
216. See id. at 330.
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just the perception, but the reality of their past-a reality which is never finally
22 6
settled:
Interpreting the direction or meaning of the historical "record" always depends
on present possibilities. When the future is open, so is the meaning of the past.
Did Indian religion or tribal institutions disappear in the late nineteenth century? Or did they go underground? In a present context of serious revival they
went underground; otherwise they disappeared. No continuous narrative or
clear outcome accounts for Mashpee's deeply contested identity and direction.
Nor can a single development weave together the branching paths of its past,
the dead ends and hesitations
that, with a newly conceived future, suddenly
22 7
become prefigurations.
At the end of the evidence, the jury deliberated on whether the proprietors
of Mashpee constituted a tribe on six specific dates between 1790 and 1976.228
The jury came up with an inconsistent-and therefore mildly subversive-answer which amounted to a full legal loss for the plaintiffs. Asked to apply
consistent criteria of tribal existence over two centuries of intense change and
disruption, the jury found that the Indians had become a tribe in the 1830s but
22 9
had ceased to be one by the 1860s.
The lesson of Mashpee may be that culture itself is a Western concept or
that the Indian version of it cannot meet the test of having essential features. A
"community reckoning itself among possible futures is not a finite archive."' 30
As Clifford asks, "[W]hat if identity is conceived not as a boundary to be
maintained but as a nexus of relations and transactions actively engaging a
subject?"' 3 a In Clifford's estimation, tribal identity had no "sine qua non," but
rather was the "contingent mix of elements" the Indians contemplated as they
conceived themselves as a culture. 23 2 When a group "negotiates" its identity, it
persists and patches itself together; it can lose "a central organ" and remain
alive.23 3 Language, land, blood, leadership, religion-any of these specific ele234
ments can be replaced.
Metaphors of continuity and "survival" do not account for complex historical
processes of appropriation, compromise, subversion, masking, invention, and
revival.... The Indians at Mashpee made and remade themselves through
specific alliances, negotiations, and struggles.23 5
Clifford depicts Mashpee culture as being created by the Indians from available cultural materials, and yet carrying on independent of their wills and
haunting them with a sense of belonging, loyalty, and duty they could not al226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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See id. at 333.
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See Id. at 338.
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ways trace with historical or logical rigor.236 Their "interest" consisted of the
qualities and consequences of their cultural identity, including owning the land
in question, even if the purpose of ownership was to reaffirm that otherwise
fragile identity. 237 It may be that the plaintiffs, having lost control of town
government, needed common land to perpetuate the viability of an Indian identity. And it may be, as Clifford suggests, that they wanted to maintain an Indian identity not so as to occupy it, but to live in the cultural space between that
identity and the conventional white world.2 38 In the end, Torres and Milun
endorse the plaintiffs' land claim not on the basis of its historic authenticity, but
in order to preserve the diversity of identities by reference to which individuals
can fashion a self.239
Thus they prefer the plaintiffs' narrative of resistance and survival to the
defendants' narrative of assimilation on the aesthetic ground that it enriches the
expressive possibilities of culture. The difficulty that Torres and Milun duck is
the same one finessed by Halley. To demand tolerance for an identity one is
powerless to change is to make an appeal for compassion; but to demand the
opportunity to fashion an identity one could live without is to make a more
difficult and dangerous appeal for approval. Once the case for protecting minority cultures is made in aesthetic rather than mimetic terms, it must suffer the
aesthetic judgment of the majority.
E. Disputing Intent and Status in a Stateless Society
In Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in Saga Iceland,240 William Miller offers an account of the linked cultural processes of
law-creation and dispute resolution in Medieval Iceland. While the sources he
relies on-the revenge sagas-are conventionally viewed as "literary" rather
than "legal," Miller reads them as social and political documents, as keys to the
code of social action. Though he conveys an infectious enthusiasm for these
sources, Miller takes an approach that is frankly more archaeological than appreciative. Though he considers the authorial intentions of the anonymous
scribes of the sagas, his real interest lies in the motives of the social actors
depicted in the stories. Thus, Miller incorporates both the New Critical rejection of authorial subjectivity and the poststructuralist tendency to read a text
largely for the traces of other texts. And here, most significantly, those other
"texts" are not literary at all, but the structures of social action-the dimensions
of wrong, redress, honor, and household obligation that render action meaningful. Within these traces, however, Miller reinserts agency and imaginative invention. Thus, his readings are self-consciously literary in the way we
recommend: it is the aesthetic of social action he is after, the artistry of jurisgenesis by ordinary people in a stateless society where the Nietzschean obliga236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
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tion to define and defend identity cannot be fobbed off onto the bureaucratic
state.
Though Miller emphasizes the artificiality of distinguishing between law
and other social norms, he demonstrates that even purely legal texts can be
illuminated by a literary apprehension. 241 Iceland had many remarkably detailed legal rules. 242 One quoted text prescribes the proper methods for removing buried bones when a church is moved, including rules governing personnel,
time of day, divisions of labor, and consecrating rituals to be performed by
priests. 243 From such sources, Miller infers that Icelandic law looks as if it
were "abstracted from specific cases rather than deduced from disembodied
principle"; that on the whole, the extent of detail suggests a highly oversanctioned society, one in which fines were assessed even for leaving portions of a
meadow unmowed.2 4
In Miller's view, Icelandic law is of such elaborate complexity as to suggest
a sheer pleasure in law's formulation for its own sake. 245 Law so permeated
the society that it became the subject matter for children's games,24 6 and funeral services included a trial to assign ghosts homes to free up space for living
souls and unhaunt houses. 24 7 The Law Rock and the Lawspeaker were central
symbols of unity and continuity. 248 In one sense, law suppressed violence,
since there were so many legal claims that could function as channels for belligerence; aggressive counterclaiming could take the place of fighting.24 9 But
the beginning of a lawsuit was as fraught with menace as an actual violent
attack. 250 Disputing was also a form of sociability in that legal actions were
freely transferable and part of a legal claim included showing the ability to
muster potential supporters.25 ' Power, legal entitlement, and reputation were
exchangeable currencies.
While the sagas are works of imaginative literature, they presuppose legal
norms and procedures, types of legal claims and strategies, and culturally plausible motives for invoking law and for obeying or flouting legal norms. They
give us a taxonomy of legal statuses and an inventory of behaviors appropriate
or inappropriate to each. While the sagas may thus serve as archaeological
data, part of what they reveal about the system of disputing is its expressive
possibilities-the resonances of meaning, the complexities of feeling, the sheer
strategic inventiveness it enabled. To Miller it matters little whether these ex241. See, e.g. id. at 222-32 (explaining how law can be analyzed from a literary perspective).

242. See id. at 43-44.
243. See id. at 222-23.
244. Id. at 223.
245. See id. at 224.
246. See id. at 227
247. See id.
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Law Rock was the place at which publication of a lawsuit was made and legal proceedings occurred.
See id. at 227.
249. See id. at 233.
250. See id. at 234.
251. See id. at 239-43.
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pressive possibilities were realized by actual disputants or merely imagined by
taletellers-they are part of the culture to be reconstructed.
Consider Miller's rendering of the short saga "Thorstein the Staffstruck,"
set in 990 and written down around 1250. 2 52 Here is the basic plot: the old
man Thorarin is a poor farmer dependent on his sturdy son Thorstein. Thorstein has a fight with Thord, servant of a rich farmer Bjarni. The dispute starts
out as a horse fight, but then Thord strikes Thorstein. The story is ambiguous
as to whether the blow was intentional or not, and this ambiguity soon becomes
critical. Thorstein retreats quietly but his father later goads him into seeking
redress. He again confronts Thord, questions what his mental state with respect
to the blow had been, and then strikes him dead. Bjarni is then goaded into
counter-revenge by, among others, his servants, Thorhall and Thorvald. Ironically, he sends these two to attack Thorstein, who kills them, as expected. But
then Bjarni's wife prods him to seek revenge personally. Bjarni demurs at first,
saying that to kill Thorstein would simply render old Thorarin dependent on
him, but finally he goes off to win revenge. Bjarni and Thorstein confront each
other, but then engage in a strange balletlike pretense of fighting. Each avoids
killing the other, and Thorstein resolves the conflict by agreeing to become
Bjami's servant.
The story is about honor, revenge, negotiation, and compensation. The preliminary questions are why Thord struck Thorstein and what sort of compensation must follow; in addition, Thorstein has killed three of Bjarni's men and
may have to compensate him. Hence, we enter a dizzyingly chaotic market
where the currencies are honor and revenge. In a section of his essay aptly
titled "The Politics of Accident,"' 25 3 Miller reveals that Thord's mental state
was linked to the mode of recompense.5 4 We normally think of mental state
as an historical event taking place inside one person's head, provable by inferences from behavior and words. But in the Icelandic "social market," where
the key and scarce commodity is honor, a past mental state is a function of
subsequent social agreement. 255 Thorstein must interpret the blow to determine
whether there is a wrong to avenge.
Thorstein is initially willing to treat the blow as an accident. When the two
servants denounce Thorstein with the offensive name Staffstruck, however,
they recharacterize the blow as an insult, in effect imputing their own malice to
Thord.2 6 Thord likewise resists the characterization of his actions as an accident, thereby daring the initially diffident Thorstein to press his case. Public
displays of forbearance needed to be cleverly orchestrated not to seem degrading to the injured party, given the ability of the injurer and others to
257
recharacterize claimed accidents as intentional attacks.
252. See id. at 52-58. The following synopsis in the text is culled from these pages.
253. Id.
254. See id at 62.

255. See id at 66. Harmful bumbling was actionable, however, if it was witnessed by five neighbors and if compensation was not paid quickly. See id.at 62. In such a case, if the bungler did not pay,
he could then be punished as an outlaw. See id

256. See id. at 63.
257. See id. at 64.
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Icelandic legal culture disdained accident claims by the injured party; indeed, both sides were dishonored when a claim of accident was lodged.258
When the injured party raised the accident interpretation, it meant that he
would prefer to drop the claim-a sign of weakness. 259 When the wrongdoer
raised accident as a defense, however, he had to offer compensation. 260 To
acknowledge responsibility and pay compensation implied that the injurer acted
out of fear of the victim. 26 1 Yet refusal to compensate meant that the wrong
then had to be prosecuted, if at all, as intentional. 26 2 Thus, both parties faced
pressure to retroactively confer intentionality on the aggressor's acts. But the
decision whether to so confer intentionality was a communal one turning on the
relative popularity of the parties, their social status, and the course of their
26 3
dealings with each other or with other members of the community.
Thus, ironically, to be the victim of accident meant dishonor as well as
misfortune, but dishonor would fall on the wrongdoer as well. 26 4 Only children, women, and the elderly had accidents. 265 "Real men" struck deliberate
blows. 266 Consequently, so long as the burden of construction fell on the
wrongdoer, the event would not be viewed as an accident at law. A master
could intervene for his servant and concede that the servant's action was an
accident and pay compensation, but that approach raised a whole set of questions about the social situation. In this case, no settlement was offered because
Bjarni was more prestigious than Thomstein, and a breach of relations with
poor, low-status people did not threaten social stability. 267
A conventional legal scholar might study this story to determine the criteria
for establishing mental state and the resulting rules governing compensation.
Miller, however, demonstrates that any inference of such rules depends on a
construction of actors' intentions, which remain perpetually susceptible to social reinterpretation. "Accident" is not a category of human action but an interpretive stratagem; its meaning is not descriptive but performative. In reading
the legal culture of Medieval Iceland to grasp the aesthetic of its legal relations,
Miller's key discovery has been that the "facts" of intention and wrongdoing
are a matter of creative-and coercive-interpretation that serves to confirm or
alter social relations.
Bjarni's failure to seize Thorstein and put him to death brings shame on
Bjarni's household. 268 Bjarni's ambivalence about exercising his legal rights is
a humiliating admission that he does not sufficiently value social obligation.
Moreover, it is precisely his own heroic past that underscores this failure; in
258.
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effect, Bjarni is a victim of his self-created social identity. 269 Thus, when he
suffers the insults of his own servants, he must have them killed to redress the
insult he has brought on himself.270 Bjami and Thorstein must then negotiate
the demands of honor to achieve the desired settlement. They undergo a ritualized ballet of threatened physical violence and actual rhetorical finesse; their
battle is a social dialogue, alternating insult and deference to establish stable
reciprocal identities. 27 ' This is not to say that their encounter is so ritualized as
to be scripted. It is, notes Miller, a game played for keeps in which the outcome is uncertain. 272 They have common interests but they must pick their
way with utmost care to realize them. To reinvoke Bourdieu:
[A]ny really objective analysis of the exchange of gifts, words, [or] challenges
... must allow for the fact that each of these inaugural acts may misfire, and
that it receives its meaning, in any case, from the response it triggers off, even
is a failure to reply that retrospectively removes its intended
if the response
273
meaning.

It is not in Bjarni's interest to take on Thorstein and his father as dependents. He has learned what a bother a servant can be, since a man of honor
must defend his servants against even the consequences of their own misdeeds.
But to kill Thorstein is to inherit responsibility for the elderly Thorarin, with no
accrual of honor since Thorstein is the lesser man.274 Indeed it is somewhat
demeaning for Bjarni to contend with Thorstein; yet he must do something to
satisfy social demands. Nor can he accept Thorstein's deference unless it
equals or exceeds the value of the lives of the three servants he has lost.275
For his part, Thorstein gains a temporary increment of honor by fighting
with Bjami but can afford neither to lose nor to win. 276 To lose is to die, while
to win is to face punishment as a murderer. The social distance between them
is such that honor will never accrue to Thorstein. Thorstein's only hope is to
show enough mettle that Bjarni can afford to spare him, without so insulting
Bjarni that Bjami is obligated to kill him after all. 277 He survives, with some
measure of honor, at the price of his freedom and his father's land. 278 As for
Thorstein's decrepit father, Bjami must contrive a claim against him to allow
the proud old man to accede, under the appearance of duress to the settlement
already achieved. 279
The story is fraught with Hegelian paradox: Bjarni cannot retain his
honored status if he treats his retainers as worthless instruments. He must re269. Bjami's reactions are complicated by frequent reminders of his reputation as a "kin killer,"
having killed his mother's brother. See id. at 70.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 73-74.
272. See id.
273. Bouirmu, supra note 43, at 5.
274. See id. at 75.
275. See MmiER, supra note 240, at 75.
276. See id. at 73.
277. See id at 72.
278. See id at 74.
279. See id at 75.
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ciprocate their deference with at least the limited recognition that protection
implies. The competition for recognition forces Bjami and Thorstein into unwanted conflict, but it also dictates that neither can achieve his purpose by
killing or even dishonoring the other. In addition to these social theoretical
implications, the saga is significant as a political allegory; it renders the loss of
freedom and the advent of feudalism as a tragic but inevitable bargain. A large
part of Miller's achievement lies in his demonstration that the setting for this
bargain is far from a state of nature.
IV.

CULTURAL READINGS OF CAPITALISM

A. Negotiating and Representing Value, Credit,and Character
Our examples of cultural criticism of law have suggested that legal disputes
can be read as social texts that reflect the role of legal norms in the art of
composing identities. In the remainder of this article, we consider how to read
the legal forms shaping transactions in modem capitalism as essentially aesthetic instruments by which people or groups try to redeem their sense of social
identity from its material origins. Our thesis is that the legal categories of modem capitalism regard economic transactions as expressions of unexaminable
preferences to be regulated, balanced, constrained, negotiated with, and
respected, but that an examination of the legal forms by which these preferences are recognized, and the doctrines by which they are regulated, reveals
that economic actors seek to establish morally satisfying social identities as part
of their career projects. Our analysis focuses on the legally recognizable forms
of wealth and the legally recognizable character types of wealthholders. These
two typologies blend to some extent as idealist projections of social forms and
identities and can best be read as aesthetic creations designed to modify, justify,
and even redeem the "purer" desire for wealth that is assumed to underlie them.
We offer currency as the general metaphor for legal constructions of worth that
enable individuals or groups to transcend their origins and trade away their
cultural liabilities.
Capitalism is not only a system of economics and politics, it is a system of
representation in which symbolic forms retain vast power over those who use
or create them. Money itself becomes a cultural force, independent of the will
of market actors; the aesthetics of the market thus control the actors in the
market. At the same time, the ideal of an absolutely free market is itself a
myth. Not only are modem markets constructed by the state definition and
protection of entitlements, they depend upon the sustenance of a social and
cultural order that constitutes and encumbers market actors, an order threatened
by unrestricted alienability.
Thus, according to Karl Polanyi, the free market unregulated by society or
government is a happy fiction.28 0 In the history of commerce, markets were
always channeled by regulation, custom, and ceremony so as to protect culture
280. See KARL PoLANyI, THE GREAT TRANsFoRMxnoN TrE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS
oF Our TimE 68-76 (1957).
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from degradation. Under the guild system, for example, "the relations of
master, journeyman and apprentice; the terms of craft; the number of apprentices; the wages of the workers, were all regulated by the custom and rule of the
guild and the town. ' 281 The mercantile system simply served to make these
rules uniform through England. 28 2 Mercantilism insisted on commercialization
as a national policy, but confined it not only within national boundaries, but
within certain sectors of the economy. 2 83 A prerequisite to the pursuit of this
policy was the development of the merchant as a social type and social classthe carving out of a cultural space for commerce.
Polanyi describes the evolution of industrial capitalism in cultural rather
than technological terms. He views capitalism as an expansion of the economic
functions of the commercial sector that changed the ways in which society was
articulated and represented. 284 With the purchase of heavy equipment and the
erection of factories,
Industrial production ceased to be an accessory of commerce organized by the
merchant as a buying and selling proposition; it now involved long term investment with corresponding risks. Unless the continuance of production was reasonably assured such a risk was not bearable.
But the more complicated industrial production became the more numerous
were the elements of industry the supply of which had to be safeguarded.
Three of these, of course, were of outstanding importance: labor, land and
money. In a commercial society their supply could be organized in one way
to be
only: by being made available for purchase. Hence, they would have
285
organized for sale on the market-in other words, as commodities.
Before industrialization, land and labor were at least partially protected from
commodification. 286 But more significantly, they were conceived as stable
components of a social order rather than economic assets. 287 To reconceive
them involved an effort of the figurative imagination because, as Polanyi puts
it:
[L]abor, land and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that
anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them .... Labor is only another name for a human

activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but
for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of
life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is not
produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power
which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through the mechThe
anism of banking or state finance. None of them is produced for sale.
2 88
commodity description of labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious.
281. Id. at 70.
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Needless to say, organizing markets in the "fictive" commodities of labor, land,
and money required law to identify and define saleable interests in each. This
technical work was facilitated by the cultural work of fashioning new social
types. This cultural work included the creation of the banker and broker as
fictive producers and the wage-worker as fictive product, and the reconstruction of the social types of gentleman and peasant so as to render them detachable from the land. Yet Polanyi argues that the representation of humanity,
nature, and purchasing power as fully alienable commodities could never be2 89
come a reality because of the catastrophic social consequences:
To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human
beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of
purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society.... In disposing of
a man's labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical,
psychological, and moral entity "man" attached to that tag. Robbed of the
protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from
the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social
dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be
reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted,
military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would
prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society....
[N]o society could stand the effects of such a system of crude fictions even for
the shortest stretch of time unless its human and natural substance as well as its
business organization was protected against the ravages of this satanic mill.290
Polanyi's key thesis is that the origin of the cataclysms of this century lies
in the "utopian endeavor of economic liberalism" to create the self-regulating
market system he deems inimical to social existence. 291 For Polanyi, the nineteenth century saw a virtual revolution in the history of human society-a commitment to gain as an explicit justification of everyday behavior. 292 In this
regard, Polanyi views Max Weber as the first great protestor against the effort
to efface the social grounding of economic systems. 293 For Polanyi, as for
Weber, humans act to sustain their social relationships more than to safeguard
their interest in material goods.29 4 Humans' greatest assets are their social
claims, and material goods serve largely to secure that end.
In this sense, the processes of production and distribution are linked to social interests rather than economic interests. For Polanyi, as for Foucault, the
real engine of the Industrial Revolution was behavioral psychology, not
mechanical engineering. 295 Factory legislation and social laws were required
to protect industrial man from the implications of the commodity fiction; land
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See id. at 73.
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Id. at 29.
See id. at 30.
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294. See id. at 46.
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laws and agrarian tariffs to protect natural resources; and central banking and
monetary regulations to prevent capitalism from killing itself through the congenital disease of overproduction. 2 96 The disembedding of production from the
traditional social order undermined a host of cultural identities but it did not
free the economy from the demands of culture. The "demolition" of traditional
society provoked the organization of new identities, especially the nationalisms
that mobilized support for social welfare policies, protectionism,
and public
297
works. It also loosed the genies of fascism and militarization.
Thus, a key task of law and literature scholarship might be to read economic transactions and legal forms for the tropes and fictions which enable the
formation and perpetuation of a commercial society and culture. We begin
with two "ethnographic" examples. The first, Miller's rendition of exchange in
medieval Iceland, provides a picture of the culturally embedded economy of a
precommercial society. 2 98 The second, Michael Taussig's The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America, depicts a peasant culture's representation
of the commodification process as a self-alienating transaction with the
devil. 299

B.

The Aesthetics of Exchange in Medieval Iceland

When property gets conveyed in the medieval Icelandic sagas, the legal
characterization of a transfer varies between dispute and voluntary exchange,
depending on the status and identity "constructions" of the parties. This was a
world where exchanges were at once ceremonial and strategic, designed to alter
30 0
or confirm a social relation rather than serve any strictly economic purpose.
Each mode of exchange had its own rules and vocabulary. 30 1 The buy-sell
relationship was viewed as a one-shot exchange with strangers or foreigners
with whom one expected no continuing relation.3 02 To offer or request such a
transaction was to declare one's indifference to, or possibly one's social distance in rank from, the other. A gift was different, because it gave the recipient
time and room to characterize the transfer. It demanded some reciprocation in
30 3
deference to the giver, but the response was left to the recipient's discretion.
30 4
Indeed, narrative suspense was a constitutive feature of gift-exchange.
Gifts had to be repaid, but such repayments were fraught with difficulties.
If one repaid too quickly or precisely, or in the impersonal currency of money,
one transformed the gift into a sale or, worse, spumed it altogether.3 0 5 Thus,
gift recipients were burdened by an obligation they could not discharge immediately or without risk. In a sense, the obligation could never be fully dis296. See id. at 202-04.
297. See iU2at 29-30.
298. See Mu, iR, supra note 240, at 77-109.
299. MIcHAEL T. TAuSSIG, TiH DEvI- AND COMIMODrrY FEnsHIsM iN SoTr
300. See M.au, supra note 240, at 82.
301. See id at 81-83.
302. See id at 82.

303. See id.
304. See id. at 80-84.
305. See id. at 82.
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charged, for the only equivalent response to a gift is another gift.
Paradoxically, the response had to be imprecise, incommensurable, excessive,
somehow unequal to count as a gift. The very discharge of the obligation conserved the imbalance, the indebtedness, and the tense ordeal of sociability initiated by the first gift.306
Some of Miller's most interesting stories involve extra-market transfers
which remained open for social interpretation even after the transfer. In an
exemplary vignette, one Ospak raids the house of farmer Alf and then says of
the goods: "They were not given, they were not paid to me, nor were they sold
either. '30 7 To say they were not paid is to say that they did not represent compensation for some past grievance. But neither were they stolen, in Icelandic
legal terms, since the taking was overt.30 8 Rather, this taking was what the
Icelandics called a ran or raid-a "open, hostile taking." 30 9 A ran put a severe
strain on the scheme of social definitions-it resembled a gift in that it admitted reciprocity, but it was the prior possessor who had to make the response and
it was the raider who won the prestige. 3 10 In such a market of symbols, the
corrective justice of the bloodfeud becomes hard to distinguish from the allocative efficiency of commercial exchange. Most crucially, in a market where
honor was the critical commodity, the social definition of the mode of transfer
3 11
was more controversial than the price.
The types of transaction in medieval Iceland included "gift-exchange, com'31 2
pensation awards, raids," and "transfers in consideration of marriage.
These categories proved crucial tools of social interpretation because the Icelanders lacked regular commercial markets; thus, all exchanges were ad hoe
and were continually subjected to flexible interpretation. 3 13 If food was consumed at the possessor's farm or if the visitor openly removed the host's horse
or cloak after sharing a meal, the transfer was deemed a gift.314 On the other
hand, if the visitor took away unused food or provisions, or took swords or
horses without having shared a meal, the parties then had to negotiate a definition of the transaction-it could have been a gift, a purchase, a raid, or a payment for a wrong.31 5 Moreover, retroactive definitions of the transaction could
change over time.31 6 Thus, in one story, one Eldgrim approached one Thorleik
and asked to buy some studhorses. 3 17 Thorleik said that the horses were not for
306.
307.
308.
309.

See id. at 82-83.
Id. at 77.
See id at 77-78.
Id. at 77.

310. See id. at 83.
311. See id. at 77-81. Interestingly, dealings in land were more complex, because the impossibility of equivalent reciprocation for the conveyance of land threatened the receiving party with long-term
subordination to the giver. Prospective recipients therefore often tried to shift the classification of a
land-gift to a sale or expropriation category so that they could avoid dependence. See id at 107-08.
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sale, and Eldgrim treated this refusal as an arrogant act that virtually invited
him to perform a ran.3 18 Once the ran was threatened, however, Thorleik
agreed to negotiate the terms of combat; once Eldgrim's "offer" was recon3 19
strued as a threat, the parties could proceed on the basis of mutual hostility.
In another story, 320 one Gunnar runs short of food and offers to buy hay
from one Otkel. Otkel refuses to sell or to give. Gunnar chooses not to perform a ran and instead proposes to buy a slave. Later, Gunnar's wife orders the
slave to steal food from Otkel. Gunnar discovers the theft and offers to compensate Otkel. Otkel refuses any settlement and summons Gunnar's wife for
the theft and Gunnar for illicit use of the property. Otkel is abandoned by
supporters at court; Gunnar is granted self-judgment and absolves himself of
liability. The price on Otkel's refusal is not the issue. Rather, the motivation is
social-the parties fence between hostility and civility, and among idioms of
32 1
gift, sale, and raid.

Otkel's "refusal to sell or give" became for Gunnar "a challenge to take
forcefully." 3 22 There was no such thing as a choice of atomized isolation.
Once Gunnar initiated, Otkel had to choose a response. He did not want a sale,
but knew that any refusal to sell could lead to a raid; at the same time, Otkel did
not want to make a gift because it made him dependent on Gunnar's later definition. 323 On the other hand, Otkel might have refused to sell precisely because
he interpreted Gunnar's offer as an obnoxious threat of raid, or perhaps as an
implicit claim of a difference in their social status. Equals did not engage in
buy-sell relations, and Otkel might have wanted to claim equality. 324 Gunnar's
wife's theft was like a ran because it was public; she thereby put the onus of
defining the relationship back on Otkel. 32 Gunnar offered to resolve this issue
by adjudication through witnesses, but Otkel was afraid his prestige was too
weak to survive such adjudication. 326 Gunnar then offered Otkel the chance to
determine the proper compensation; being at Gunnar's behest, however, this
suggestion was actually an insult to Otkel.3 27 Thus, a party's resistance to sale
selfhood to the market forces of
exposed him to the danger of subjecting his
328
prestige-currency and social interpretation.
C. Soul-Selling and Commodification in Colombia
In The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America, Michael Taussig
draws on the Marxian notion of commodity fetishism, Polanyi's concept of
fictive commodities, and Weber's classic study of religion and capitalism to
318. See id. at 102.
319. See id. at 101-04.
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read the industrialization of peasant societies less as a process of disenchantment than as a totemic struggle of competing spirit worlds. 329 For Taussig, the
cultural problem confronting agricultural entrepreneurs in developing societies
is aptly stated by Marshall Sahlins:
Induced to raise a cash crop, [peasants] would not react "appropriately" to market changes: as they were interested mainly in acquiring specific items of consumption, they produced that much less when crop prices rose, and that much
more when prices fell off. And the introduction of new tools or plants that
increased the productivity of indigenous labor might only then shorten the period of necessary work, the gains absorbed rather by an expansion of rest than
of output .... [T]raditional domestic production ...is33production
of use
0
values, definite in its aim, so discontinuous in its activity.
As Weber argued, this eminently commonsensical attitude can only be overcome by a "long and arduous process of education," culminating in the acceptance of accumulation as a "calling." 331 The aim of this process is the
inculcation of a new perception of time as continuous, measurable, fungible,
cumulable, and exchangeable. Measured in time, labor becomes intelligible as
2
a fungible fictive commodity, analogous in form and function to money. 33
The inculcation of such a new metaphysics may require or engender a new
religious experience or a repopulation of the spirit world. 333 Once peasant laborers come to experience work as time, they can make themselves reliably
available to employers. By the magic of the contract, the narrative suspense
surrounding gift exchange is eliminated and it becomes possible to secure the
future availability of the factors of production.
In one of the milieus Taussig studies, the sugar plantations of the Cauca
Valley in Colombia, 334 the alien legal forms of currency and the wage contract
were appropriated by the peasantry as metaphors. These forms represented the
spiritual dialectic of disenchantment and re-enchantment, dispossession and
possession that attends the coming of capitalism.
The residents of the Cauca Valley were the descendants of emancipated
slaves and the inheritors of a syncretistic religious tradition, which integrated
African animist elements into a Catholicism that had traditionally vilified such
animism as devil worship. 335 Taking advantage of political instability, many
former slaves were able to establish themselves in the nineteenth century as
allodial or collective farmers by squatting on land, driving out masters, or farming and gathering on undeveloped land. 336 A lengthy struggle ensued to force
these ex-slaves and their descendants into wage labor on plantations, by rounding them up, driving them off the land and fencing it, charging them rent in
329. See TAussIa, supra note 299, at 3-38.
330. Id. at 20-21 (quoting MARSHALL SAmUNS, STONE AGE ECONONCS 86 (1972)).
331. MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPmrT oF CAPrAISM 62 (Talcott Parsons
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cash or labor, or destroying their crops. 337 For a century after abolition, the
peasant farmers of the Cauca Valley continued to see these stratagems as at338
tempts to restore slavery.
339
In the twentieth century, peasant farming came under new pressures.
Population increases resulted in the subdivision of plots. 3 40 Development loans
enabled the large haciendas to purchase peasant lands and encouraged the remaining peasant farmers to shift from subsistence farming and gathering to
cash crop monoculture. 34 1 The resulting indebtedness and dependence on fluctuating prices drove many more peasants into wage labor.342 The decline of
subsistence farming also eroded communal patterns of work and consumption.
By the time of Taussig's research in the 1970s, few peasants were able to support themselves on their own land. 343 Most families combined peasant farming
with wage labor on the plantations. 344 They described wage labor as more
lucrative, but intensive, to the point of destroying their health. 345 Wage labor
also subjected them to a level of supervision that remained identified with
346
slavery.
Taussig invokes this context of social and economic change in explaining
two dangerous occult rituals said to prevail within the community. The first
was a rite of self-commodification leading to diabolical possession:
According to a belief that is widespread among the peasants of this region,
male plantation workers sometimes make secret contracts with the devil in order to increase productivity, and hence their wage. Furthermore, it is believed
that the individual who makes the contract is likely to die prematurely and in
great pain. While alive, he is but a puppet in the hands of the devil, and the
money obtained from such a contract is barren. It cannot serve as productive
capital but has to be spent immediately on what are considered to be luxury
consumer items, such as fine clothes, liquor, butter, and so on. To invest this
money to produce more money-that is, to use it as capital-is to invite ruin.
If one buys or rents some land, the land will not produce. If one buys a piglet
to fatten for market, the animal will sicken and die. In addition, it is said that
plantation
the sugarcane thus cut will not regrow. The root will die and the3 47
land will not produce until exorcized, plowed over, and replanted.
Even though the ritual was ascribed only to the most productive and best
remunerated wage workers, reports of the ritual gave voice to a critique of the
entire system of wage work as demeaning, self-alienating, unhealthful, and encouraging of selfishness. 3 48 Beyond that, the notion that the devil's seed is
337.
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barren expressed a perception that cash crop monoculture, both on and off the
plantations, undermined the economic viability of peasant farming and the social ties it sustained. This critique was also expressed in anthropomorphic representations of both sugarcane and money as diabolical forces. 349 Taussig
evokes a long tradition in the Cauca Valley of political broadsides against the
plantation owners portraying sugarcane as an evil spirit bent on enslavement.3 50
But he also reports widespread belief in, and anxiety about, the ritual of baptizing money, according to which:
[T]he godparent-to-be conceals a peso note in his or her hand during the baptism of [a] child by the Catholic priest. The peso bill is thus believed to be
baptized instead of the child. When this now baptized bill enters into general
monetary circulation, it is believed that the bill will continually return to its
owner, with interest, enriching the owner and impoverishing the other parties
to the deals transacted by the owner of the bill. The owner is now the godparent of the peso bill. The child remains unbaptized, which if known to the
parents or anybody else would be a cause of great concern since the child's
soul is denied supernatural legitimacy
....
This practice is heavily penalized
35 1
by the church and the government.
The baptized bill would receive the name of the child, and its godparent could
summon the bill by name.352 Taussig repeats accounts of baptized bills making
off with contents of cash registers and reports that payment with such a bill was
a criminal offense.35 3 Anxiety about the dangers of baptized bills reflected
fears of capital investment and commercial exchange as con games, enriching
capitalists at others' expense. 35 4 The surreptitious appropriation of the baby's
soul and name indicates that the perceived threat of capital was not solely economic; it also critiques economic investment as the perversion of a natural principle of growth symbolized by the child and realized in peasant agriculture.
Taussig resists a reading of these rituals as quaint and prerational superstitions.3 55 For one thing, he argues, they pithily express real dynamics of impoverishment, dislocation, and dehumanization which accompany economic
modernization.3 56 By contrast, he argues, these losses are unremarked and unaccounted for in the discourse of an established market society. 35 7 To the peasants of the Cauca Valley, the notion that the accumulation and investment of
capital enhances social welfare was a myth belied by their own experience.
Instead, it reflected a perverse fetishism of commodities and currency.3 58 At
the moment of economic modernization, we find not rationality triumphing
over superstition, but contending mythologies reading one another.
349. See id. at 93-94.
350. See id.
351. Id. at 126.
352. See id. at 126-27.
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D. Interest, Credit, and Characterin Renaissance England
The early Renaissance development of the legal regulation of economics
has been characterized as the triumph of rational market economics over the
forces of feudal superstition and narrow-mindedness.3 5 9 A society that, as we
shall see, viewed land as the only moral form of wealth, that denounced creditors as sinful usurers, borrowers as desperate failures, and the international
trade and money market as a conspiracy of illusionists, came to view trade,
abstract money, and pump-priming credit as the true sources of prosperity.
This historical reading is supported by two closely related areas of legal regulation: usury law and bankruptcy law. This economic and legal transformation,
however, required a huge expenditure of moral and aesthetic capital. Traces of
this expenditure are discernible in the evolution of the new cultural forms of
merchant vocation, moneylending at interest, currency, and credit. What follows is a "literary" reading of this transitional era in English commercial law.
This reading treats technical legal developments as entwined with the creation
of a type of social character who can be viewed not just as an economic stereotype but as a dramaturgic model capturing the moral norms and tensions of a
society that needed a new concept of the self to accompany an emerging capitalist system.
In the early Renaissance, when England still theoretically forbade all profits
on loans, court and church law distinguished interesse from usura.360 Interesse
represented the damages a creditor could obtain for the harm caused by the
debtor's failure to repay-sometimes even damages representing the loss of
investment opportunity. 36 1 By contrast, usura represented any pre-arranged
profit or any pre-arranged liquidated damages. 362 Perhaps the key to usury was
that the lender had no right to arrange profit on the loan if he in no way arranged to share the risk of the debtor's activities; otherwise, he was gratuitously
profiting from the debtor's labors, the supposed true source of the debtor's
anticipated profits. Thus, medieval theology assumed-in a way ironically
consistent with Marxism-that the legitimate source of profit was human labor,
not the mere use of money.
The histories of usury detail countless legal maneuvers and restructuring
devices by which lenders evaded the usury laws-most often by reconceiving
the loan as a rental or mortgage on land or an annuity. 363 But as late as Shakespeare's time the courts and Church were still insisting, at least in their explicit
generalizations, that pre-arranged profit on loans was always illegal, regardless

359. See, e.g., POLANYt, supra note 280, at 70 (describing the transformation from feudalism to
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of whether or not the lending was "biting"-i.e., cruel and exploitative to the
364
debtor.
By the 1550s, however, two distinct positions had emerged in Continental
theology and law and had begun to affect England. First was an objectivist
position-holding illegal and immoral any lending with a guaranteed return
more than the value of the loan. Second was a subjectivist position-holding
3 65
that there was no reliable external measure of the morality of a loan.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, these parallel developments in
theology and market economics had produced in England a conflict between
two distinct conceptions of interest and usury. Whereas traditional court and
canon law defined certain loans at interest as per se usurious, the new, more
usurious intent, at least for loans up to
Protestant approach declined to presume
366
a certain statutory rate of interest.
In the legislative battles that led to the usury laws of 1571 and 1624, these
two views were contested and negotiated. 367 Legal change was slow and erratic, but the law of usurious lending eventually came to reflect a compromise
between these two competing perspectives. These legal developments were accompanied by the emergence of new social imagery appropriate to the new
character type of the legitimate money merchant. This was a figure who was
morally selective in his lending, following natural equity as well as contractual
law. He never took interest from paupers, or profited more from the loan than
the borrower did. Moreover, he deliberately made some gratuitous loans to
rate of maxipoor debtors (whom he often forgave) and respected the statutory
368
mum interest, and he always consulted the public good.
Lawrence Stone offers an interesting view of the social character of the
lending class in the late Elizabethan era. 369 This class, or group lies at the
transition between merchants and bureaucratic officeholders, on the one hand,
and landed gentry on the other.370 As progressively more wealth flowed into
the merchant class at the turn of the seventeenth century, the merchants and
artisans tried to absorb and sustain aristocratic values. 37 1 For example, members of the merchant class frequently tried to convert their money into land, not
off rents was dignified, while living
just for security but also for status: living
372
not.
was
income
professional
earned
off
As a result of this transformation in character, the best deterrents to violation of commercial laws were the notions of honor, generosity, and temperance
364. JoYcE OLDAm APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

ENGLAND 67-68 (1980).
365. See BENJAMIN Nm.soN, TE IDEA OF USURY: FROM TRma.L BROTRmmHOOD TO UN

ERSAL

OTmERHOOD 73-108 (2d ed. 1969).
366. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 363, at 41.
367. Id.; THOMAS WILSON, A DIscouRsE UPON USURY 155-69 (2d ed. 1962).
368. APPLEBY, supra note 364, at 67-71.
369. See generally LAWRENCE STONE, THE Ciusis OF THE ARSTOCRACY 1558-1641 (1965).
370. See id. at 6-9, 23-25, 28.
371. See id. at 23.
372. See id. at 24.
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that had become paradigmatic of the social model.373 "Credit" remained a key
concept, reflecting reputation, honesty, and solvency.3 7 4 As merchants found it
increasingly feasible and profitable to lend at interest, the merchant character
counterbalanced this questionable activity of lending for a profit.
Thus the new legislation was part of a cultural transformation which focused on the character of the properly interested moneylender, rather than the
attempt to draw a line between good and bad loans. No one loan on its face
could be determined to be usurious or not; the context and the character of the
lender was decisive. The result was a statutory and judicial construction that
was as much a charter for proper character development as an economic
regulation.
The history of bankruptcy law affords a direct parallel and a more richly
documented example of the collective creation of a cultural identity for a social
character-the virtuous merchant or the man of commercial interest. 375 As
with the cultural advent of the good moneylender, early bankruptcy law invites
a reading in cultural and aesthetic terms as dramaturgy. English society conceives a character type to express its ambivalence about early capitalist economics, and the character becomes enriched by social imagery and related legal
regulation-it plays to type. But the character takes on a life of its own, adapts
to and in turn changes the commercial circumstances in which it was conceived, and in turn helps induce changes in the law of bankruptcy which justify
themselves on the basis of a new conception of the merchant character type.
The first English bankruptcy statute, in 1543, presupposed that debtors,
"[w]here divers and soondry persones" who "consume the substaunce obteyned
and delicate lyving, againste
by credyte of other men, for theyre owne pleasure
376
all reasone equity and good conscience."
The law was a purely punitive device which assumed that most debtors
were elusive absconders-often typed as devious Jews or Lombards. Its purpose was to give brute power to creditors to arrest the flight of the debtor and
dismember his estate.
This stereotype was often identified with that of the merchant. During this
period merchants were viewed as people who bought and sold goods but
neither produced nor consumed them. 377 They were elusive middlemen who
insidiously manipulated the market by trading on the abstract value of goods
rather than either introducing materiality into commerce or using materiality for
economic productivity.
Accordingly, early bankruptcy law tried to constrain and target its brutality
by applying itself only to specific debtors who met the criteria for being
merchants. For example, the 1572 Elizabethan version of the so-called trader
rule defined a potential bankrupt as a "merchant or other person using or exer373. See id. at 233; APPLEBY, supra note 364, at 69-70.

374. See SToNE, supra note 369, at 233-48.
375. See Robert Weisberg, CommercialMorality the Merchant Character,and the History of the
Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3, 13-55 (1986).
376. Id. at 21 (quoting 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-43)).
377. See id. at 13-16.
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cising the trade of merchandize by way of bargaining, exchange, rechange, bartry, chevisance, or otherwise, in gross or by retail .... or seeking his or her
378
trade of living by buying and selling."
Underlying the law was the image of the merchant as a sly manipulator, an
exploiter of smoke and mirrors. 379 He operated in the emerging and distrusted
world of credit, starkly contrasted with the solid values of land and artisans. 38 0
Although the emerging capitalist economy depended for its solvency and liquidity on these abstract market machinations, it also harbored deep moral am38 1
bivalence about them.
What the history of commercial law then shows, however (as the necessity
of credit markets became more evident) is the emergence of a counterperception, or a newly conceived identity for the merchant. 38 2 English law and culture by the seventeenth century began to treat credit and commerce, however
abstract, as ethereal and spiritual bonds among people and nations, the solvent
of brotherhood and the glue of international harmony. 383 Abstract money,
which had been viewed as an elusive and insidious falsehood, was rationalized
as a sort of symbolic force of nature, not an object of devious manipulation. 3 8
Credit was imagined in ideal terms as not only desirable but inevitable-a natural good-and the merchant was its secret specialist.
All the possessions [of commercial societies] consist[ed] of scattered and secret securities, a few warehouses, and passive and active debts, whose true
owners are to some extent unknown, since no one knows which of them are
paid and which of them are owing .... The wealthy merchant, trader, banker,
etc., will always be a member of a republic. In whatever place he may live, he
will always enjoy the immunity which is inherent in the scattered and unknown
character of his property, all one can see of which is the place where business
in it is transacted. It would be useless for the authorities to try to force him to
fulfill the duties of a subject; they are obliged, in order to induce him to fit in
with their plans, to treat him as a master, and to make it worth his while to
contribute voluntarily to the public revenue. 385
If the "moral problem of credit lay with the image of the merchant as a
creature of pure interest, unconstrained by any traditional standards of religious
virtue or social responsibility, the solution had to lie in a justifying ideology of
self-interest" as itself virtuous. 386 Mercantile self-interest ensured predictability and enhanced reasonable reliance. 387 This was "le doux commerce"-an
international utopia of mutual dependence.3 88 The very elusiveness of credit
378. Id. at 22 (quoting 13 ELiz. ch. 7 (1570)).
379. See id. at 13-16.
380. See id.
381. See text accompanying note 377 supra.
382. Weisberg, supra note 375, at 16-21.
383. See id.

384. See id.
385. Id. at 18 (quoting Quesnay & Mirabeau, Extractfrom 'Rural Philosophy,' quoted in A.
, THE PAssioNS AND mm IzNnaars 94-95 (1977)).
386. Id. at 18-19.

Hmscmn

387. See id. at 19.
388. Id.
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3 89 The
capital shows it not to be morally barren, but a communal, public good.
fragile arms-length commercial links of the mercantile world are the links of a
new utopia.39 0 Here is some of the new, positive imagery of credit:
Of all beings that have existence only in the minds of men, nothing is more
fantastical and nice than Credit; it is never to be forced; it hangs upon opinion;
it depends upon our passions of hope and fear; it comes many times unsought
for, and often goes away without reason; and when once lost, it is hardly39to1 be
quite recovered .... It very much resembles ... fame and reputation.
The new, affirmative figure of the merchant was a Weberian Protestant ethical hero whose greed was really a calling, whose self-interest was indeed a
counterweight to other passions. 39 2 This new notion of the merchant required a
new aesthetic apprehension about the nature of economic and social life:
[Divine Providence] has not willed for everything that is needed for life to be
found in the same spot. It has dispersed its gifts so that men would trade
together and so that the mutual need which they have to help one another
would establish ties of friendship among them. This continuous exchange of
all the comforts of life constitutes commerce and this commerce makes for all
the gentleness of life . ... 393
The merchant was the hero of international concord-he blurred boundaries,
and softened military characters. With the new appreciation of commerce in
the seventeenth century, English law and culture had created a new, inverted
identity for the merchant. He was viewed not as slyly manipulative, but as
weak in a sense in which all humans subject to the vagaries of fate and the
market will recognize. A remarkable turnabout in English bankruptcy law
marked this change in perception. The merchant debtor, formerly an absconding villain who manipulated the ethereal phenomena, now was the sympathyinvoking hero of the economy, the passive, sacrificial figure who suffered the
accidents of the natural and economic world in order to enhance the movement
of capital.
This new identity arose from the fact that the very elements that made the
trader a suspicious character also made him a sympathetic one. When, for example, in the 1705 Statute of Anne, the right of discharge was added to the law,
it ratified the more positive image of the merchant and then affected construction of the trader rule. 394 The discharge rule made it tolerable (though not quite
395
yet very desirable) for a debtor to be the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding.
As a result, the trader rule faced a new counterpressure to expand to include

389. See id,
390. See id. at 19-20.
391. Id. at 20 (quoting C. Davenant, An Essay upon the Probable Methods of Making People
Gainersin the Balance of Trade, reprintedin 2 THE PoLrcAL AND ComMERcIAL WoRKs OF CHARLE

D'AvmA 275 (C. Whitworth ed., 1771)).
392. See id. at 19 n.52.
393. Id. at 19 n.53 (quoting J. SAVARY, LE PARFArr NEGocLANr 1, quoted in A. IH1RscMAN, Tsm
PASSIONS AND Tim INTEES 59-60 (1977)) (emphasis omitted).
394. See id. at 30.
395. See id.
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deserving debtors. 3 96 The state of being a bankrupt debtor changed from a
reprehensible crime to a sympathetic commercial crisis. 397 Only traders suffered losses by accident-others lost through prodigality.3 9 8 A trader's capital
3 99
is uncertain and invisible-a reversal of the earlier epistemological problem.
The uglier implications-rumor, illusion, collusion-were the corruption of the
mercantile condition, not an inherent part of it.
E. Representing Wealth and Worth in American Law
The question of what money represents has complex sociological, religious,
philosophical, and even literary roots. In Medieval Europe the holy grail was
the original exotic artifact, symbolizing divinity, kingship, and wealth. Lice
money, it was a pure floating signifier. Thus, empty of meaning, it could be the
vessel of meaning, a perfect symbol of the union of the real and ideal, the
earthly and the divine. The earliest grail sellers lived in trading centers, and the
grail was the heart of the notion of both literary and financial symbolism that
promised both wealth through credit economics and redemption for a dying
400
aristocracy.
Literary critic Marc Shell also notes the long tradition of literary fascination
with money as symbolic representation. 40 1 This fascination with money arises
from the puzzling symbolic ambiguities arising from inscribing meaning into a
piece of dull metal or into a piece of "worthless" paper.40 2 For example, "when
the inscription disappears from the surface of a coin, is the remaining ingot still
money?" 40 3 Or when "the ingot itself disappears leaving nothing but the in40 4
scription," is this remainder still money?
A coin may be both sign and intrinsically valuable, but paper money is all
symbol.40 5 Credit money further widens the gulf between the symbolic value
of money and any underlying commodities. 40 6 Thus, with increasingly widespread use of credit, paper, and negotiable instruments, the critical significance
396. See id. at 31.
397. See id. at 32.
398. See id.

399. See id.
400. See MARC

SaEL, MoNEY, LANGUAGE, AND THroUHT: LITRARY AND PHILosOPHIcAL EcONOMICS FROM THE MEDmVAL TO THE MODERN ERA 40 (1982) ("The grail was the sign of an age not only

of impoverished aristocrats who, like the [sinner]/fisher king, seemed to await redemption, but also of a
new merchant class, which greeted graceful mercy and money... as its special emblems."). The royal
merchant hero became a character type to replace older heroes, and the divine store sought by grail
heroes was replaced by alien property sought by merchants. Cf id. at 45-46.
401. See id. at 27-46.
402. See Id. at 15 ("This relationship of sign or symbol (the inscription) to substance (the ingot) is
the heart of the aesthetic version of the paper money debate.").
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See hi at 19 ("While a coin may be both symbol (as inscription or type) and commodity (as
metalic ingot), paper is virtually all symbolic").
406. See id. ("As Marx argues, credit money (the extreme form of paper money) divorces the
name entirely from what it is supposed to represent and so seems to allow an idealist transcendence, or
conceptual annihilation of commodities.").
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of money to culture became enriched. 40 7 Faust's "Paper Money" scene is Goethe's critique of idealist philosophy. 408 Washington Irving was fascinated by
the relationship between monetary inscriptions and "mere words." Commenting on inflation during a 1720 paper money experiment, Irving said,
"[p]romissory notes, interchanged between scheming individuals, are liberally
discounted at the banks, which became so many mints to coin words into cash;
and as the supply of words is inexhaustible, it may readily 40be9 supposed what a
vast amount of promissory capital is soon in circulation.
As we have seen, some New Historicists portray art as a social and economic "product" that strives mightily to efface its grounding in economics.
The historicist critic challenges this aesthetic, seeking to redistribute the tools
of critical power. A central theme of the New Historicism, then, is the dissolution of the division between the economic and the aesthetic, the alienated and
the authentic, the subjectivity of the consumer or investor and that of the romantic artist. Thus, New Historicists argue, the inner sensibility celebrated by
nineteenth-century literature is also the private sphere of bourgeois life, furnished with the consumer goods that drove the Industrial Revolution.
Charlotte Gilman's The Yellow Wallpaper,for example, describes the effort
both production and consumption-to be "selfto make oneself into a site of
4 10
actualized" into the market.
Dreiser didn't so much approve or disapprove of capitalism; he desired pretty
women in little tan jackets with mother-of-pearl buttons, and he feared becoming a bum on the streets of New York. These fears and desires were themselves made available by consumer capitalism, partly because a capitalist
economy made it possible for lower-class women to wear nice clothes and for
middle-class men to lose their jobs, but more importantly because the logic of
capitalism linked the loss of those jobs to a failure of self-representation and
linked the desirability of those women to the possibility of mimesis. 4 11
Capitalism thus creates objects of desire and then the subjects that desire
them.4 12 Writing, like money, is an ineffable blend of the material and the
ideal, and thus depicts the internal drama of characters seeking to situate themactor both seek to fulfill the
selves in a market culture.4 13 The artist and market
4 14
roles depicted in their own self-representations.
at 18 ("With the advent of paper money certain analogies, such as 'paper is to gold as
407. See id.
word is to meaning,' came to exemplify and inform logically the discourse about language.").
408. See id.at 102 ("The Paper Money Scene is part of a critique of the idealist philosophy that

operates without material guarantees or substantial securities.").
409. Id. at 19 n.39 (quoting Washington Irving, The Great Mississippi Bubble: A Time of Unexampled Prosperity, in THE CRAYoN PAPIRS 38 (1883)).
410. See WALTER BmN Mrcm'AEms, THE GoLD STANDARD AND THE Loic oF NATuRALIsM 13

(1987) (describing Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The Yellow Wallpaper, in Tr

CHARLOTm PEPxNs

GILtMAN READER (Ann J. Lane ed., 1980)).
411. Id. at 19.

412. See id. at 20.
413. Cf.id at 21 (writing is "neither material nor ideal .... And the drama of this internal
division... is" an urgent artistic concern in the period between the Civil War and World War I).
414. See id.
at 26-28.
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A brief excursus on the Marxist notion of the fetishism of commodities is
useful here. 4 15 The critical Marxist seeks to avoid the "voluntarist" error of
reducing the functional requisites of capitalism to the preferences of powerful
capitalist actors. 4 16 Thus, law may exhibit power independent of or in opposition to the will of individual capitalists or even the capitalist "class," and yet at
the same time also articulate the systemic requirements of capitalism. The key
example of such relative autonomy is the formal equality of status afforded
equally to workers and capitalists in a liberal state, and manifested in a host of
civil rights and liberties. 4 17 Since this equal status is undermined in practice by
the inequalities of political, economic and cultural power associated with class,
it is merely formal.4 18 However, it sets limits on the power and privilege of
capitalists and is, in this sense, autonomous from their will. The relative autonomy of this "legal form" from the will of actors results from what Balbus calls
419
a "homology" between the legal form and the commodity form.
At the political level, individuals are homologized into the abstract identity
of equal "citizens" in order to make political and economic representation of
their "interests" possible. Indeed, humans become their "interests," ceasing to
act like social beings, but instead merely inviting commodity-like negotiations
with others' interests. The homology between commodity form and legal form
threatens to become identity when we encounter anthropomorphized enterprises, legal persons that are also negotiable property interests. Individuals and
inanimate enterprises then become mutually commensurable and negotiable on
the plain of interests.
The development of American legal forms in the nineteenth century is
largely about the evolution of a right of negotiability as a means of abstracting
money from tangible property or from individual market transactions and assignments. Money became a more abstracted symbol that could float above
property and contracts, though it could always be reduced to those things when
necessary. For Morton Horwitz, the abstraction of property and contract into
money had a "shattering effect" on contract law. 420 Legislatures resisted the
negotiability of private money out of fear of losing control of the money supply. Thus, law in a capitalist society controlled the meaning of social and contractual relations by controlling the ability of inscriptions of debt and value to
float free of their origins, to achieve transcendent abstraction. 4 21 But there is a
more complex story to tell about the rise of commercial formalism in American
law and economics, a story which oddly parallels the development of the
merchant character in England.
415. See Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 'Relative Autonomy' of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'y. REV. 571, 574 (1977) (defining the fetishism of commodities).

416.
417.
418.
419.

See id. at 572-73.
See id. at 577-81.
See id. at 577.
Id. at 584-86.

420. MORTON HoRwrrz, THE TRANsFOwRMArON OF AMmCAN LAW 147 (1977).
421. See id. at 212-26.
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1. Transcendental commerce.
It may be hard to imagine two nineteenth-century philosophers as different
as Marx and Emerson. Yet Emerson was, in his own way, equally fascinated
by the relation of money, commodity, symbol, and value.42 2 In imagining labor as a form of idealist endeavor, Emerson asserted that in paying for labor we
should be paying for the knowledge and virtue of the laborer. In any society
past the minimal barter stage, we must do so through symbols of currency that
can translate knowledge and virtue into wealth and credit. Though these symbols become somewhat abstract and are therefore subject to counterfeiting, the
Marxist warns us of the dangers of fetishism and alienated labor; Emerson reminds us that we need commodification to capture dynamic process in stable
form. 423 Ironically, the Emersonian idealist does not denounce commodification as much as the materialist Marxist does.
For Emerson, to denounce commodification is to implicitly make a very
questionable claim for the transparency of symbolism that denies the key dynamic quality of symbols. It is to assume a rigid relation between symbol and
reality, rather than to accept the endless exchange of energy between the world
of symbols and the processes they represent. Commerce is not the degradation
of virtue but the medium of virtue. Economic complexity and conflict may
indicate that humans unfortunately misperceive value in exchange, but that
does not make exchange itself immoral. For Emerson, economic forms border
on the sacramental.
2. Protectionism.
An explicit legal example of the "application" of transcendentalism to legal
doctrine is offered by Howard Horwitz in his boldly imaginative book, By The
Law of Nature.424 Horwitz offers the initially improbable idea that commercial
regulation in the form of trade protectionism can be read as an aspect of American transcendentalist literature. 425 This notion finds strong support in Polanyi's
argument that one of the most underrated forms of social legislation in the
nineteenth century was the use of a national currency. 426 According to this
view, the original thinkers of economic liberalism considered national imprints
on currency meaningless, since they viewed money as a pure medium of exchange. 427 Yet governments, recognizing money as a political tool and a
purchasing asset, turned monetary nationalism into a major form of social protectionism, which, according to Polanyi, was even more important than labor
428
legislation, social security, or land use controls.
As Horwitz argues, both protectionism and transcendentalism sought to reform the internal economy (national and individual) to perfect American char422. See HowARD HoRwrrz, By rHmLAw oF NAruRE 74-76 (1991).
423. Cf. id. at 76 ("the commodity, like nature, is a hieroglyph intimating the divine").
424. Id.

425. See id. at 57.
426. See PoLAryi, supra note 280, at 24-25.

427. See id. at 231-32.
428. See id.
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acter so that property could become an instrument to higher ends. 429 What
protectionism protected was the individual and the nation from the volatility of
markets. It encouraged the kind of self-reliance which harmonized with universal will, as opposed to purely free trade which promoted a vulgar variant of
individualism, selfishness. Protectionism was to enlarge citizens' consciousness of their interdependence with capital, labor, farmers, and merchants. Free
trade, on the other hand, was viewed as a false, negative freedom, in which the
merchant essentially enslaves individual labor to foreign commercial intermediaries and degrades men into machines. Under protectionism, one can
flexibly choose the market in which one competes. And by protecting the
home market, protectionism would lead to a perfecting of world markets and
ultimately render itself unnecessary. The good commercial character would
become a universal. 430
3.

Naturalmoney.

Walter Benn Michaels's view of money in the nineteenth century captures
this haunting quality and its role as currency of identity. 43 1 For Michaels, capitalism creates both its objects and its subjects; it creates the desires for the
commodities it creates. Money both has value and no value, as it is both a real
thing and a representation, and bourgeois art endlessly plays on this relationship. 4 32 Like money, bourgeois art is neither ideal nor material. That is, it is
not ideal in so far as it has cash value, and it is not material insofar as its value
is a function of its meaning. After all, a thing can be sold many times at once
and in different places. In Michaels', critical history, the goal of Naturalist
literature was to end representation-to capture the thing itself, and so the rhetoric of money as representation helps us appreciate the moral aesthetics of certain legal forms. 433 Some forms of practical writing are avowedly part of the
market. While more refined types purport to transcend vulgar market effects or
origins, all writing is indeed ultimately part of commerce. Michaels shows
through the example of the Naturalists how literature is indeed part of the
4 34

market.

A perfectly representative character for Michaels is Frank Cowperwood, of
Dreiser's The Financier. For Cowperwood, the actual commodities he could
acquire were not real enough because they were not mental enough. Money
could flout ordinary conceptions of identity, "producing its own harvests and
determining the value of products whose worth it was intended only to
435
symbolize."
The characters in Naturalist novels look to the storehouse of legal forms to
produce those representations of wealth that can help them forestall the self429. See HoRwrrz, supra note 422, at 57-61.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

See id. 61.
See note 410 supra and accompanying text
See Micttzm..s, supra note 410, at 156-59.
See id. at 156-61.
See id. at 137-80.
Id. at 68.
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destructive dangers of capitalist logic-excessive production or excessive consumption-to create an everlasting identity for themselves. Money and corporate form provide continuity of personal identity. The person needs a
permanent impersonal form, and the impersonal form needs a personal identity,
so the person takes on the role of owner or guardian of the fortune.
Michaels traces the parallel worries of writers and legal scholars as to
whether a corporation is "real" and notes the non sequiturthat reality is somehow associated with personhood. 43 6 A corporation, however artificial and dif-

ferent from a natural person, can be as "real" as an artificial lake.437 As
Michaels notes, the early finance capitalists, like Dreiser himself, were less
concerned with the distinction between the infinite "verbal" and the finite
"physical" than we might have supposed. 438 Rather, these early financiers
were more disposed to see the infinite power of language not as a threat to
capitalism but as an essential part of its technology. 439 It is the purpose of
artificial legal bodies to immortalize desires and to govern and express
interests.
Capitalists like Cowperwood produce legal forms like the futures contract,
the corporation, and the trust to arrest the volatile dynamism of the market. In
the untrammeled market, commerce can destroy itself by overproducing, ironically flouting human intentions. The human endeavor to produce leads to unintended panics, and nature replaces work as a force of the economy. Art, of
course, is supposed to reflect timeless truth and beauty that escape the market.
Capitalists like Cowperwood express this hope by converting art into a form of
wealth which they hope merely to accumulate, not sell. The perverse result is
that art becomes too much like a commodity, dependent on acceptance for
value. Lacking absolute value, it ends up looking just like money.
Thus, as Michaels plays out the bizarre permutations of the real and the
represented, avarice is just another form of aesthetic retreat that strives but fails
to escape the market. 4 0 Does one want money to have the unused power to
buy? Does one buy for the pleasure of buying, not owning? The spendthrift
enjoys buying nothing, while the miser wants to stay out of the market by using
money to buy money. If the value of gold depends on its scarcity, then it
depends on the value it would have if it were not money. Those who love the
inherent value-beauty of gold treat its value as aesthetic, as representational. 44 1
We do not desire things in themselves-we want representations, or, more perversely, we want real things that look like representations. Art is neither
merely formal nor an illusionistic image of something else. It marks the potential discrepancy between material and identity, the discrepancy that makes

436. See id. at 188-206.
437. See id. at 203.
438. Id. at 200-13.

439. See id.
440. For Michaels' inquiry into the historical perception of currency, see id. at 139-46.
441. See id. at 146.
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money, painting and people possible. As Michaels says, misers love gold be442
cause to them it represents money.
The relevance of this literary history to law is that the advent of a money
culture inspires legal and aesthetic efforts to create forms which express and
contain the dynamic forces of market capitalism. Rather than see such forms as
the negotiable instrument as suppressing the true social relations underlying
economic transactions, 443 a literary approach to these forms sees them as more
complex aesthetic vehicles. Ideological and legal battles over money are bizarre, because the legal actors fail to realize that the conditions under which
these conflicts occur really create the subjects of the conflicts. It may be a
perverse fallacy that economies can be subjects and have desires, but it is a
fallacy that makes an economy possible and accommodates our tendency to
view natural objects as if they were human. For Michaels, souls living under
capitalism know what they do and why they do it, but not what they do does.
These souls cannot comprehend the connection between individual acts and the
whole economy. Personification of the economy, and smaller personifications
of economic forces in legal forms, are efforts to ease the anguish of this
uncertainty.
4. The corporation.
For Michaels, the corporation represents the eternal capitalist life, the form
of commerce that transcends the vagaries of commerce. 44 A corporation is
usually viewed as "a fictitious artificial person composed of natural persons,
created by the state, existing only in contemplation of law, invisible, soulless,
immortal." 44 5 What is fictitious is the attribution to corporations of personhood, and yet this fiction may be intrinsic to the prevailing concept of person, which, in turn, implicitly explains the acts of individuals by reference to
such mysterious spectral entities as the will or the soul. 446 Since the corporation is imaginary, it is easy to impute human desire or other qualities to it and
this imputation, in turn, reflects the way we imagine ourselves. Likewise, people, at least as commercial actors, may be constructed corporate fictions.
The corporation is a figure of ravenous desire, conceived as a mere agent of
distribution but ending up as the great consumer of value. It is the answer to
the wonderful question of capitalism that Michaels poses: How do rich people
who seem to have all that a person could want manage to keep on wanting? 447
A person has to have a limited body and hence a limited appetite, but the corporation can transcend these limits. Just as the corporation, saviorlike, takes upon
itself the liability of its investors, it also takes on their desires and keeps them
442. See id.
443. HoRwrrz, supra note 420, at 231.
444. See MicHAE.s, supra note 410, at 202-13.
445. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., CorporatePersonality,24 HARV. L. REv. 253, 265 (1911) (noting
that the entity which is personified by the corporate fiction is itself no fiction).
446. See id. at 256-58.
447. Id. at 205-06.
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safe from satiation. 448 And if a corporation has no essential personality, we are
wholly free to impute to it anything we want. This is the ironic essence of
literary Naturalism, reducing both things and persons to personifications of
supposedly biological or material forces. 44 9 Capitalism, like nature, has a
weird purposiveness. The same human mind that can create an epic poem by
conceiving and depicting the great monstrous purposive forces of physical and
human nature can conceive of the corporation as the formal embodiment of
such forces.
5.

The monopoly trust.

So long, however, as the corporation enjoyed and suffered the legal rights
and responsibilities of a "person," it was subject to attack under anti-monopoly
laws because it was seen as a willful market agent.4 50 Howard Horwitz uses
aesthetic criteria to "read" the monopoly trust, a bizarre late nineteenth century
legal instrument, as the solution to this legal (and cultural) problem. 45 1
According to Horwitz the trust form was designed to circumvent laws that
prohibited interstate ownership, and to bring order to competitive chaos
through vertical and horizontal integration. Corporate directors abdicated control to trustees, and stockholders turned their shares into trust certificates. 452
Thus, the trustees ran the businesses, not the shareholders or directors whom
the corporation supposedly embodied. 453 Hence, the trust represented a "decapitation of the corporation," a viciously clever device to erase any traces of
individual agency or will in commercial transactions so as to evade conventional legal responsibility for torts or breaches of contract. As such, the trust
went much farther than the corporation in dissolving the individualist ego into a
higher spirit that is both the end of and the apotheosis of American individualism. The trust transgressed and at the same time enhanced individualism.
Horwitz asks the intriguing question: What is the relationship between the
monopoly trust and transcendentalism? Was the first John D. Rockefeller a
transcendentalist? Was he the Emersonian man? Was Frank Cowperwood, the
hero of Dreiser's The Financier,the Nietzschean man? 454 Horwitz draws on
Emersonian aesthetics to help us understand how the "robber barons" of that
era altered the corporate entity in a manner that reflected the nineteenth century
American cultural struggle over the role of individualism. 4 55 The great irony of
the big corporation was that it crushed the individual under the weight of abstract commercial power while also reflecting the triumph of voluntarism and
of a disembodied will freed from the constraining particularity of the empirical
individual or social group.45 6
448. See id. at 187-88.
449. See id. at 200-03.
450. See id. at 182-83
451. See HoRwrrz, supra note 422, at 171-91.
452. See id. at 182-83.
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id. at 181-86.
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If we believe that individual will is the original and only proper ground for
moral judgment, then the character of the trust threatens that belief. Dreiser's
Cowperwood says: "A man... must never be an agent... acting for himself
or others" 457 because to represent is to introduce the possibility of misrepresenting. The trust enables the superman to appear to be the mere medium of
transcendental forces.
In that sense, corporate practice and literary practice are "affiliated cultural
formations." For all their differences, Emerson and Rockefeller use the same
logic; "the morality of action is justified by the transcendence of personal
agency. Emersonian self-reliance, epitomized in the famous transparent eyeball figure, seeks virtue and self-perfection in self-eradication. '458 And "the
financer's immorality was obscured in the shadow of the institution he
spawned." 459
The key to Rockefeller's success was his skill in getting confidential information-his skill was not occult, but highly strategic. 46 o For Emerson's visionary compact between mind and nature, self and other, the harmony is never
a balanced negotiation but an endless exchange and appropriation.46 1 The
poet's integrative faculty draws the concrete into the public and the universal.
Rockfeller's faculty is the subtle eye for collecting information. But it is a
rapacious and imperialistic mind that does the integrating. Mere commodities
take on universal, transcendent significance when purified through the self, and
visible form is no longer essence. As in politics, purporting to merely be the
medium through which plural wills or a collective will speaks may merely sublimate the most arrogant expression of power. This is consonant with Darwinian notions of capitalism: Carnegie's view that there is a "special talent"
intrinsic to the self and independent of material circumstances that causes
462
wealth.
Through the monopoly trust, the corporation gave up "mean egotism" and
agency to an "autotelic" figure. 463 Commercial exchanges were no longer interest-driven transactions but traces of natural market forces merely represented
in the passive medium of the trusteeship. In this ironic separation of ownership
and control, the trust was an invisible non-entity; it had no legal form and filed
no reports. It could not be found because it was pure illusion and elusion. The
trustees claimed not to be agents of real principals, but rather the "actualizers"
of market forces.4 64 No formal traces of agency were ever left. No contracts
were drawn, but parallel transactions occurred in natural harmony. The trust
was "sheer form." It "did nothing." 465 It was dressed up in utopian justifications as an ideal universal democracy, blurring the public and private. Ida
457. THEDooE DRmism, THE FINANCIER 44 (1912).
458. HoRwrrz, supra note 422, at 172.
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HoRwrrz, supra note 422, at 184.
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Tarbell said of Rockefeller what Emerson said of the universal merchant:'466
"His
body is in one spot, but his eyes are turned to all regions of the world.
6.

The family trustee.

A final example of the cultural aesthetics of legal form is a logical extension of the monopoly trust-the family trustee or fiduciary. As described by
the sociologist George Marcus, a fiduciary is a catalytic character who converts
interests into disinterestedness. 467 He is a negotiator among social and cultural
norms, economic forces, and wealth. The fiduciary serving as a trustee for
family wealth translates the rapacious and often conflicting self-interests of the
heirs of a patriarchal financial dynasty into a rational collective unit, one whose
collective interest in self-perpetuation requires transcendence over the individual interests of the members. 468 On the one hand, individual rapacity, the force
of selfish agency, is transformed into the self-less, transcendent interest of the
family. At the same time, the warmth, loyalty, commitment, and sentiments of
family life are transformed into a cold impersonal monolith.4 69 The cultural
instrument to achieve this negotiation is a legal form-the family trust in its
various guises. A fiduciary is the perfect figure of the person who transcends
interests by effacing his own agency. 470 He acts for and in the interests of
others. In so doing he also purifies those interests by embodying them in the
person of a disinterested fiduciary. 47 1
The trust is a form of social discipline of capitalist energy: while the classical story of modernization sees labor as undergoing discipline to be able to
participate in rationalized production processes, the trust form performs the
same role for capital itself.472 Capital especially requires discipline when the
children of the great patriarchal estates become sufficiently tempted by anomic
consumption interests to threaten dissolution of the estate.4 73 As the family
ages into patrician and noblesse oblige status it also becomes weak, such that it
must create a transcendent, controlling emblem of itself to ensure cohesion and
reputation. 474 The phenomenon of the dynasty is an aberration in a democratic
culture and yet, as an icon of upward mobility, an object of veneration in a
culture no less devoted to opportunity. 475 The dynasty's emblematic qualities
come not from the individual commitments of heirs to their common lineage,
but from the law and work of fiduciaries. 476 In so far as the dynasty is an
emblem of upward mobility it represents individual opportunity that, because
466. Id.
467. GEORGE E. MARcus wrTH PETER DOBKIN HAIL, LrvEs ne TRUST. THE FORTUNES OF DYNAsric FA~mts INLATE TwENTm-m-CENruRY AMERICA 71-72 (1992).
468. See id. at 72.

469. See id.
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471. See generally id. (describing the role of the fiduciary in American family dynasties, and
emphasizing the importance of disinterest, rationality, and stewardship).
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of its multigenerationality, holds forth the promise of an endless future of evergreater wealth and achievement. No matter how lowly and humble, any individual can aspire to eventual transcendence through his posterity, since there is
no formal boundary of blood and lineage restricting entry into the American
aristocracy.
One specific type of trustee, which Marcus calls the insider-outsider, 477 is a
very refined sort of cultural-legal artist. He is close enough to the family to
occasionally consult on familial disputes, but the family understands that he
must maintain neutrality and distance if he is to help the family negotiate its
self-transcendence. 478 This fiduciary injects the dynastic interest into diffuse,
volatile family relations, and monitors the linkages of family and property
through their gradual, anticipated decoupling. A good trustee monitors the dynamic processes of money transformation into an apparently static form that
allows the holders of the wealth to appear as passive beneficiaries. 479 Under
capitalism, fiduciaries are especially vital because wealth is a dynamic abstraction and depends on "a coordinating human intermediary to perform these
transformations. ' '480 The trustee is thus a subtle director for this social drama.
"The fiduciary," Marcus claims, "is interested in money and values as abstractions within the conventions of investment institutions"; 4 81 for the family members, he is a legal specialist carrying out plans, explaining their rights and
duties by translating events into a legal calculus, sometimes demystifing the
reified nature of family wealth-sometimes re-reifying it to prevent members
from dismembering the corpus. As he performs the technical tasks of fending
off taxes and regulations, the trustee helps construct the family's wealth for
different purposes, using alternative images or abstract forms to serve various
4 82
needs.
For Marcus, the disinterested fiduciary can act for those who are interested
yet remain above suspicion himself, since his stewardship is not of any individual interest, but of the family as a whole. Ironically, the technical servant of the
family is also the morally superior preacher to it, performing the tasks that
members cannot do themselves and often would, individually, prefer not to see
done at all.4 83 The fiduciary is "rational" in a complex way: He carries out and
embodies the rational self-interest of the family, but must synthesize it out of
the possibly irrational appetites of the individual members. Thus, he is an artist
of legal forms and cultural norms, whose working material is the conceptual
4 84
currency of law and business.
In its quest for a noble cultural identity, the family projects an ideal representation of itself and then subordinates itself to that representation. The fiduciary was both the creator and protector of that representation, thus saving the
477. Id.
478. See id. at 72.

479. See id.
480. Id. at 57.
481. Id. at 72.

482. See id. at 69.
483. See id. at 68.
484. See id. at 62-70.

May 1997]

CULTURAL CRITICISM

1217

family from itself. The foundation became a superior fiduciary product; institutional donations replaced individual merchants' donations.4 85 As a result,
American philanthropy came to depend on the beneficiaries of the patriarchal
48 6
donors, the people whose "job" was to enjoy rather than to consume capital.
This group includes charitable institutions that receive money and spend it according to fiduciary norms. Of course this often means cultural institutionssuch as museums, universities, and libraries-so that we bring aesthetic transcendence full circle. Beyond these trusted managers of philanthropic capital
stand the brigades of cultural service workers they support-the artists, authors,
musicians, curators, librarians, and academics who complete the cultural laun7
48
dering and embroidery of capital.

The fiduciary ensured the optimal set of donations-though this may have
been more or less than the maximum sum of those individuals. Organized dynasties dissolve after a few generations, but their enduring legacy is a fiduciarymanaged trust of patrimonial capital. In the effort to create a timeless entity,
the trust must circumvent such explicitly time-bound laws as the rule against
perpetuities-hence the notion of the perpetual charitable foundation, the permanent agent of disinterestedness.4 8 8 The trustee-artist finesses the tension between the demands of money management and the dynamics of family
sentiment, though his actions are likely to constrain and distort the latter to
489
serve the former.
The family does not pressure the fiduciary to resolve family disputesindeed, the family may even recruit ad hoc consultants for that job. "The transcendence of the fiduciary is thus mutually sustained by the fiduciary and those
he serves. 49 0 The fiduciary might be partly independent of the family, but his
own life is at the edge between the two forces he balances.
As Georg Simmel noted in The Philosophy of Money: "The ideal purpose of
money, as well as of the law, is to be a measure of things without being measured itself, a purpose that can be realized fully only by an endless development. '4 9 1 Hence the fiduciary is a "human incarnation of the abstract
functioning of law and money," 492 the authoritative interpreter in a legal and
capitalist idiom of a rich family's constitution and development, seen by family
members themselves less rationally and holistically. The trust is a reified phenomenon replacing patriarchal authority 4 93 Family members "trust" not family feelings but cold abstraction. The fiduciary helps interpret family life
without exposing itself to interpretation beyond the mere affirmation of its authority. Thus, in capitalism, a form of lineage and dynasty finds strength in a
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
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mechanism defined by a rationality that is "alien to the '4mix
of sentiment and
94
self-interest which we think motivates family relations.
An interesting aspect of the fiduciary profession is that it is anthropologically self-conscious, using such revealing criteria to describe itself as "disinterestedness, stewardship, and rationality. '4 95 The profession assumes that social
relations are driven by self-interest, and that families are odd mixtures of competition and cooperation. Family loyalty always comes dynamically mixed
with individual greed. The job of the trustee is to harness and balance those
energies, 496 but also to offer the world-and the family itself-a better interpretation of these family dynamics.
The family's capital and identity achieve ultimate transcendence of interest
with the foundation of a philanthropic trust for the support of the arts or the
disinterested pursuit of knowledge. 497 To preserve itself accumulated capital
must work itself free of interestedness, so that the abstraction of legal form
proves to be a logic of transcendence as well as commodification-a double
movement of alienation of the material from the human and of the anthropomorphosis and apotheosis of the material. The accumulation of capital is accompanied by a constant effort of the imagination, reconstructing an always
ephemeral region of the sacred, temporarily just beyond the bounds of commodification, but always on the verge of profanation and obsolescence.
7. Postmodernism and commercial form
The Emersonian view of commercial form finds a fascinating echo in contemporary critical theory. Postmodernist scholars like David Harvey have discerned that poststructuralist form is exemplified by the contemporary
commodification of money, reduced to (or exalted to) electronic international
blips that defy normal constraints of space and time.4 98 Money symbolism, in
the pop culture-criticism of this era, becomes the art of the 1990s. "Swap"
transactions 499 and electronic manipulations of the Eurodollar market 5 0 have
become the abstract impressionism of contemporary commerce. Indeed, if
there were deconstructionists writing for the Wall Street Journal,they would
say that we cannot control our representations because they end up implicating
all the other representations of which they are a network. In a postmodernist
culture of symbolic inflation, all styles at once are on display, a circulation of
diverse and contradictory cultural elites. We are suffering, implies Harvey, a
crisis of representation, a readjustment of our sense of time and space in politics, economics, and culture. A whole recent issue of the literary journal
494.
495.
496.
497.
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Diacriticsaddressed how crises in representation are simultaneously aesthetic
and financial. 50 1
Marx had called money the lubricant of community, but money has become
the "real" community of international relations, the International Monetary
Fund the institutional embodiment of globalization that the United Nations pretends to be. To perform the commodity function, money must be replaced by
symbols of itself-in credit instruments. If, in a Marxist view, the bourgeoisie
cannot survive without endless revolutions in the technology of commodification, without sped-up turnover time and liquidity of capital, to exacerbate the
insecurity and so maintain the availability of workers, capitalist money production must be in an endless state of revolution. And now we can say that money
is truly fictitious capital-all investment is a credit bet either on production not
yet realized or others' misperception of the value of what has been or will be
realized. Possibility masquerades as currency. Thus to the postmodernist cultural critic, economic policy is cultural policy. But government policy therefore has to control the fluid and open spaces of money markets-to contest
within its borders the effects of widespread individualism and ephemerality,
and to carve out islands of fantasy amidst the tempests of currency-since if
currency is the only medium of self-expression, there can no longer be any selfinterest to pursue.
Post-modernist pronouncements of the death of subjectivity to the contrary,
we are probably far from such a predicament. The particular representations of
subjectivity most recently venerated will follow the inevitable logic of cornmodification and profanation, but they will be replaced by others. The work of
culture in market society is not the preservation of existing identities from
alienation. It is the imaginative work of constantly fashioning new identities
and new institutional forms that briefly embody them before turning into
"pods." For better or worse, the very rapidity of commodification remarked by
post-modemists engenders a corresponding speed up in cultural innovation.
Legal disputing, transacting, enacting, and planning are implicated in that constant, Sysiphean effort of imagination. It follows that the literary dimension of
law is not lost in some remote Arcadian past when politics was virtue, when
work was craft, when exchange was fraternity. Instead, the literary imagination
is inherent in the law of modem society, simply because law is both the means
by which we continuously refashion society and one of the media in which we
represent and critique what we have fashioned.
Does law's participation in the work of humanizing the market make law
inherently redemptive? Yes, so long as we understand redemption as an aspect
of the functioning of a market economy rather than an escape from it-a balm
for civilization's discontents rather than a cure. The cultural redemption of
capitalism, like the abatement of pollution and the disposal of waste, paradoxically conserves the conditions of its own necessity. To identify law as redemp501. See generally DrAcRmcs, Summer 1988 (reviewing various articles on economics and real

property).
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tive in this sense is to portray it less as an antidote to alienation than as a codependent.
But the imaginative work of law involves much more than the cosmetic
ornamentation of market society. The fictions and figures of law are the very
architecture of not only the diverse markets, but all the other institutions that
compose society. These institutions have no necessary pattern or purpose to
which culture must conform. 50 2 The institutions we establish, the roles those
institutions constitute, the dramas of dispute and transaction those roles enable,
the institutional changes those dramas bring about-these are neither constraints on culture nor causes of culture. They are culture itself.
V.

CONCLUSION

It follows that reading and criticizing the fictions, figures, and stratagems of
law is indispensable to cultural criticism. George Marcus and Michael Fischer
have observed that twentieth-century cultural criticism has typically taken one
of two forms: "First, at its most philosophical, cultural critique has posed as an
epistemological critique of analytic reason... grounded in the sociology of
knowledge ....The effect of this style of cultural critique is demystification
....-"5o3 While noting that demystification has been an aim of Nietzschean,
Marxist, and Weberian cultural critique, Marcus and Fischer add that epistemological criticism is most recently associated with poststructuralist semiotics. A
second style of cultural criticism, also drawing on Nietzsche, Marx, and Weber,
has emphasized the "romantic" critique of modernization: "It worries about the
fullness and authenticity of modem life and idealizes the satisfactions of communal experience. Behind the growth of the market, bureaucracies, large corporations, and professional social services, it sees a decline of community and
of... individual self-worth .... ,,5o4 Victims of their own success, both of
these forms of cultural criticism have lost their capacity to shock or inform:
"[a]s rhetorical strategies they have become exhausted." 50 5 It is now understood that the particular enchantments of traditional society are lost forever, and
that they have been replaced not by transparent rationality, but by other enchantments. Accordingly, we have argued throughout this article that criticism
is no longer well-served by the familiar rhetorical attitudes of skepticism and
sentimentality. But there is a third model of cultural critique derivable from the
classic critics of modernity, Nietzsche especially. The aim of such criticism is
not to recover virtues of the heroic age but to fashion new ones. Thus con502. For example, while Polanyi, Balbus, and Taussig argue that the formation of "capitalism"
involves inculcating belief in fictive commodities, one may equally portray the analytic category of
"capitalism" itself as an imaginative construct, since its three defining features-commodity production,
capital accumulation, and free labor-have no necessary connection or determinate meaning. See RoBERTO MANABmiRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SrrUATION AND rrs TASK 101-119 (1987) (describing
the difficulty in determining the key concepts of capitalism); Binder, What's Left, supra note 2, at 200208.
503. GEORGE E. MARCUS & MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY A CULTURAL CRITIQUE: AN
ExPRmmrAL MomENT IN THE HuMAN ScIENcEs 114 (1986).
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ceived, the cultural criticism of law is part of the work-at once political and
aesthetic-of choosing what kind of culture we hope to have and what kind of
identities we hope to foster.

